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ABSTRACT 
In March 2018, the Chinese National People’s Congress voted to abolish 
presidential term limits, paving the way for Chinese President Xi Jinping to rule the 
country indefinitely. This decision was but one part of a broader trend of power 
centralization taking place within the People’s Republic of China. Driven by Xi’s 
desire to centralize power in himself and in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this 
trend has reversed the institutionalization of several rules and norms in Chinese politics, 
begging the question: How exactly was Xi able to overcome decades of momentum to 
bring about significant changes within the Chinese political system? In this 
thesis, I test two possible explanations for Xi’s success. First, I examine the 
possibility that Xi leveraged a strong desire among many members of the CCP to restart 
political and economic reforms within the country in order to persuade the party to back 
his political changes. Second, I test the idea that Xi has paved the way for his 
changes in the political sphere by using his anti-corruption campaign to purge 
political opponents from the CCP and to silence others. Using the best available 
evidence, I conclude that the preponderance of evidence indicates that Xi utilized both 
these methods to strengthen his personal power and reverse the trend of 
institutionalization in the Chinese political system, but the changes Xi has brought to 
the Chinese political system could not have been possible without the support of the CCP 
as a whole. 
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1 
I. A CHANGING CHINA  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
In March of 2018, the People’s Republic of China’s National People’s Congress 
(NPC) voted to abolish presidential term limits, removing the only legal, temporal limit on 
the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) highest office thereby paving the way for current 
President Xi Jinping to rule the country indefinitely. The decision is reflective of a broader 
trend presently occurring within the Chinese socioeconomic and political spheres —the 
centralization of the power and the authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within 
President Xi Jinping himself.1 Such a trend represents a clear break with the previous 
decades, during which Chinese leaders, starting with Deng Xiaoping, implemented a 
program of political and economic reform that dramatically changed the Chinese political-
economic system. In the political sphere in particular, Deng and his successors oversaw the 
institutionalization of rules and norms meant to govern the burgeoning system of collective 
leadership.2 Collective leadership—“a system with a division of responsibilities among 
individual leaders in an effort to prevent arbitrary decision-making by a single top 
leader”— was Deng’s political answer to the arbitrary, unpredictable, and personalistic rule 
of his predecessor, Mao Zedong.3 Hoping to prevent the uncertainty, chaos, and economic 
disaster that defined the worst of the Maoist period, Deng attempted to develop a system 
of governance that would prevent any one person from amassing such a large amount of 
political power.4 
                                                 
1 Alice Lyman Miller, “Only Socialism Can Save China; Only Xi Jinping Can Save Socialism,” China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 56 (May 17, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/only-socialism-can-save-
china-only-xi-jinping-can-save-socialism. 
2 Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2018) 10-12. 
3 Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016). 13.  
4 Richard Baum, “The Road to Tianamen: Chinese Poltics in the 1980s,” in The Politics of China: 
Sixty Years of the People’s Republic of China, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar, 3rd ed. (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 337–467. 
2 
For roughly three decades, it appeared that the process of institutionalizing the rules 
and norms of collective leadership was working smoothly. Top leaders in the CCP served 
out their full terms, peacefully leaving their offices at the appropriate age or after the 
conclusion of their term, to be replaced by a new generation of leaders chosen by consensus 
within the upper echelons of the CCP.5 Yet despite the indications that the rules and norms 
promoted by Deng had been institutionalized in the Chinese political system, Xi has been 
able to reverse some of these innovations and amass substantial amounts of political power. 
Most prominently, the recent abolition of the term-limits on the PRC’s Presidency 
combined with Xi’s decision not to nominate his successor to the office of General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of China suggests that he will not be giving up power at 
the Twentieth Party Congress in 2022 in accordance with the norms surrounding his office 
and his age.6 While the motives behind Xi’s moves to centralize power may only truly be 
known to Xi himself, the question of how Xi was able to expand and centralize the power 
of the CCP remains to be answered. How exactly was Xi Jinping able to centralize political 
power in the CCP and why does there appear to be so little opposition to this dramatic 
break with the past? 
To answer this question, I tested two explanations concerning Xi’s centralization 
of political power. First, I evaluated the view that the CCP backed or even encouraged Xi 
to consolidate political power in the PRC within himself, searching for evidence that, one, 
the CCP had ample reason to be dissatisfied with the system of collective leadership and, 
two, they acted on those grievances. Second, I evaluated the anti-corruption campaign to 
determine if Xi leveraged the campaign to gain power over his political opponents, 
searching for evidence of political patterns within the anti-corruption campaign itself and 
evidence that the campaign has silenced criticisms of Xi. Ultimately, although there is 
evidence to support both these explanations, I assess that the changes Xi brought to the 
Chinese political system could not have come about without support from other members 
of the CCP. While the anti-corruption campaign has certainly targeted those who, for 
                                                 
5 Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of 
Democracy 14, no. 1 (February 5, 2003): 6–17, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2003.0019. 
6 Miller, “Only Socialism Can Save China; Only Xi Jinping Can Save Socialism” 7.  
3 
political reasons, do not want to see power concentrated in Xi as a person, there seems to 
be a broad consensus within the party that, in order to continue tough economic reform in 
the country, political power within the PRC has to be concentrated on a single, powerful 
individual. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Understanding exactly how Xi consolidated power in the PRC and in the CCP is 
significant both for those who wish to thoroughly understand the PRC and for the broader 
academic discussion concerning institutions and their formation. With respect to the 
former, Xi’s political moves have come at a time of great transition for the PRC. 
Economically, the country is in the process of transitioning from a middle-income economy 
to a high-income, fully developed economy, and, diplomatically and militarily, the country 
has risen to the center of the world stage, alarming many other major nations across the 
world, especially the United States. However, such changes do not happen in a vacuum; 
they all link back to and indeed may be rooted in the political program Xi has chosen to 
pursue. Understanding how China has moved into the twenty-first century requires 
understanding how Xi has guided China there. 
As China moves along the path Xi has charted, an understanding of Xi’s political 
program will also inform those who wish to know whether the country and its ruling party 
will be successful in the future. For some, Xi’s political program is the exact opposite of 
what is necessary to successfully move the PRC into the future, a centralized and repressive 
authoritarianism at a time when movement toward a more open and democratic system 
would be better for the country’s long-term success.7 The upper echelons of the CCP 
certainly know that many are bearish that Xi’s power consolidation will move the country 
in the right direction but have encouraged Xi to move ahead anyway or, at the very least, 
they have been forced into it. Understanding how Xi amassed enough power within the 
party to go ahead with his power-consolidating reforms will help shine a light into the 
                                                 
7 David L. Shambaugh, China’s Future (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2016), 124-136. 
4 
workings of the CCP and may lead to better predictions about its future and therefore the 
future of the PRC as a whole.  
Xi’s power consolidation also brings into question the broader discussion about 
how informal rules and norms are institutionalized across countries. Before Xi, some 
viewed the political process within the CCP as being highly institutionalized, a crucial 
cornerstone of the explanations for the exceptionally resiliency of the Chinese regime.8 Yet 
Xi’s actions seem to have turned that explanation on its head. Understanding how Xi 
consolidated power will answer the question of exactly what it takes to overturn what were 
thought to be robust institutions or, separately, the question of how institutionalized the 
rules and norms governing the CCP were in the first place. At a time when political actors 
seem to be challenging and overturning rules, norms, and even institutions themselves, 
analyzing how Xi overcame rules and norms in China will undoubtedly be significant to 
the broader questions concerning the robustness of institutions and the institutionalization 
of rule and norms in other countries. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
With the rise of Xi Jinping in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the 
Chinese political system has entered a dynamic period. The system of collective leadership, 
the formation of which had been the dominant trend in Chinese political culture over the 
past three decades, is being challenged by a political system of centralized leadership. 
Reforms that were meant to liberalize the economy and perhaps eventually the political 
system have been replaced with reforms meant to bring power back to those at the center 
of the CCP. For some, a repressive spell reminiscent of the Mao era has descended over 
the PRC. 9 The ideology, the propaganda, and the way power is being wielded at the top 
all mirror the time when the former chairman of the CCP was the unquestionable ruler of 
the PRC. Except this time, it is Xi Jinping, not Mao Zedong, who is the orchestrator and 
executer of these all-encompassing changes to Chinese society. For others, while it may 
                                                 
8 Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard,” 7. 
9 Kelly Hammond, Rian Thum, and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, “China’s Bad Old Days Are Back,” Foreign 
Affairs, June 1, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-30/chinas-bad-old-days-are-
back. 
5 
not be business as usual in the CCP, the political changes taking place in the CCP do not 
represent a complete reversion to the Mao era. 10 Xi lacks Mao’s revolutionary credentials, 
and he is nowhere near as publicly venerated as Mao was. And while Xi has abolished term 
limits for the PRC presidency, this can easily be seen as a sign that Xi values the law within 
the PRC enough to actually change it rather than ignore it outright. 11 Still, even if the 
changes to the Chinese political system are not as extensive as some might suggest, the 
question of how was Xi was able to push through the abolition of presidential term limits 
in conjunction with his decision not to appoint a successor to his position as General 
Secretary of the CCP remains a fascinating topic worthy of study.  
There are three important elements within the existing literature that bear directly 
on this important question. The first concerns the move from the politics of the Mao era to 
the politics of collective leadership. A thorough understanding of what collective 
leadership is and how it came to be is important to fully grasp the significance of the 
changes Xi has made in Chinese politics because the move to collective leadership was 
such a significant trend within Chinese political culture. The second concerns the current 
extent of the move from collective leadership to the politics of the Xi era. Just as the move 
to collective leadership exhibited outward, observable signs, so too has the move to 
centralization. An analysis of these markers is important in deciphering just how significant 
and extensive that move to centralization actually is. Finally, the third debate concerns the 
question at hand—how Xi able was to enact significant changes within the Chinese 
political system. The literature suggests at least three avenues Xi used to consolidate his 
power: the elevation of his allies and faction members to positions of power in the CCP, 
his ability to capitalize on feelings of frustration within the CCP, and an environment of 
widespread repression initiated by his anti-corruption and ideological campaigns. All will 
be discussed in sequence below.  
                                                 
10 Alice Lyman Miller, “The Eighteenth  Central Committee Leadership With Comrade Xi Jinping As 
General Secretary,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 48 (September 9, 2015), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/Eighteenth -central-committee-leadership-comrade-xi-jinping-general-
secretary, 4-8. 
11 Taisu Zhang, “Xi Won’t Go,” ChinaFile, February 25, 2018, 
http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/xi-wont-go. 
6 
1. Collective Leadership: What It Is and How It Came to Be 
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping and his allies began pushing to reform the Chinese 
political sphere and implement a set of rules and norms known as collective leadership. 
Collective leadership, best described by Cheng Li, the director of the John L. Thornton 
China Center at the Brookings Institution, is “‘a system with a division of responsibilities 
among individual leaders in an effort to prevent arbitrary decision-making by a single top 
leader.’” 12 As one might expect, the system is defined by an effort to make decisions via 
the consensus of the top office holders. To that end, Deng and his successors implemented 
many reforms to make this possible, including term limits for government office holders, 
unofficial retirement ages for communist officials, and a restructuring of the CCP itself.13 
At the center of all the reforms is the idea that the communist party should not be allowed 
to atrophy and die, and that one of the central mechanisms to achieving this is the regular 
rotation and retirement of communist and government officials and their replacement by a 
well-trained group of younger cadres.14 
Whether one views collective leadership as having been fully institutionalized or 
as a work in progress, the system and the movement toward it was certainly the dominant 
trend before Xi rose to power. The country had experienced regular successful transfers of 
power numerous times since Deng Xiaoping officially removed himself from the realm of 
politics. This trend was not specific to the presidency or the other top offices in the PRC, 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party and the Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission (CMC), the three of which formed the leadership trifecta. Power transfer in 
similarly important bodies—the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Politburo 
Standing Committee (PSC) to be specific—had also begun occurring peacefully and on a 
regular basis beginning with the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982.15 Additionally, power 
was shared between these many different bodies. While there was no question that the man 
                                                 
12 Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era. 13.  
13 Baum, “The Politics of China,” 342-345. 
14 David L. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: Univ. of 
California Press, 2008) Table 4.1. 
15 Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era, Figure 3.1. 
7 
who held the three top offices was the official leader of the party and the government, that 
leader was considered to be the “first among equals,” a part of the leadership that 
collectively governed the country.16 This state of affairs gave rise to the idea among some 
that, after years of uncertainty concerning political power and its transfer, the CCP and the 
PRC had successfully consolidated the institutions surrounding the transfer of power.17 
The significance of this move toward collective leadership lies in the fact that this 
was not always in the case in China, and this process has generally been difficult for any 
countries with authoritarian governments. For the party’s first few decades of existence, 
ultimate political power undoubtedly resided with Mao Zedong, and as such, the transfer 
of power occurred only by death (or disability) or by purge.18 Mao’s death in 1976 ended 
his reign and soon began that of Deng Xiaoping, who, like Mao, was the leading figure in 
Chinese politics (albeit not the top office holder) until his death in 1997. Like Mao, Deng 
held ultimate decision-making authority despite his lack of a formal office. However, 
unlike Mao, Deng used his authority to institutionalize politics within the PRC primarily 
by reforming the leadership structure and methods of political competition within the CCP.  
Deng his allies in the reform of the PRC’s political and economic systems were 
motivated by two distinct but complimentary impulses—to avoid the worst of the 
preceding, Maoist era and to avoid the fate befalling other Communist regimes at the time. 
First, Deng appears to have been reacting to disastrous results from the previous, Maoist 
era, when the extreme concentration of power in the hands of Mao had allowed him to 
initiate destructive policies and purges like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution.19 Mao’s death in 1976 had ended this monopoly on power and allowed Deng 
(who had himself been purged from the leadership) to return and bring about much needed 
reforms to society. Second, Deng’s push for reform was only furthered by the domestic 
and international events that began in 1989 and continued well into the early 1990s. In 
                                                 
16 Li. 8.  
17 Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard,” 7.  
18 Baum, “The Politics of China,” 343.  
19 Baum, 339. 
8 
chronological order, the CCP was shaken to its core first by the Tiananmen Square 
uprisings, followed by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and 
finally the collapse of the world’s leading communist government, the Soviet Union.20 In 
a scramble to figure out exactly what had gone so wrong and how they could avoid such a 
fate, the CCP embarked on an extensive postmortem of the fallen regimes, concluding that 
one of the main causes of their downfall was the structure of the ruling party.21 Many 
Chinese analysts cite several of the same factors that pushed Deng to begin reforms in the 
first place, including an overconcentration of political power in one top leader and the lack 
of an institutionalized method for replacing top leaders.22 
As mentioned above, the extent of the institutionalization of this system of 
collective leadership is up for debate, and the answer to this question is crucial in 
understanding how Xi managed to centralize power. If the institutionalization was not fully 
complete or had never really begun in the first place, Xi’s efforts to centralize power would 
have been much easier than if the system had been fully institutionalized. Li and others 
argue that the system of collective leadership was more or less successfully 
institutionalized by Deng and others and is operating as it should be. The evidence of 
several successful transitions of power at all levels of the Chinese government and the CCP 
since the early 1990s points supports this conclusion. The CCP Central Committee 
experienced an average turnover rate of roughly sixty percent between the Twelfth and the 
Sixteenth Party Congresses.23 Crucially, the fact that political leaders, especially those in 
the top offices, have been able to serve out their full terms and retire for the past several 
decades with few exceptions is indicative of the fact that the system of collective leadership 
has been institutionalized in the PRC.24 In addition to this, the structure of the CCP and the 
government of the PRC themselves reflect the collective nature of the decision-making 
                                                 
20 Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 2. 
21 Shambaugh, 2. 
22 Shambaugh, Table 4.1. 
23 Shambaugh. Table 7.1  
24 Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard,” 8-9.  
9 
process. The important issues affecting the country are delegated to committees, not 
individuals, which, nominally, make decisions on these issues via consensus.  
Alternatively, others argue that the system of collective leadership was never 
successfully institutionalized because Deng used his personalistic power to build the 
system. As Richard Baum, the former director of the UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, 
writes, “In his quest out lead China out of the ‘feudal autocracy’ of the Maoist era toward 
modernity and rule by law, Deng increasingly resorted to highly personalized instruments 
of control—instruments that were the very antithesis of the system he sought to create.” 25 
As such, Deng was never able to fully implement the system he worked so hard to establish 
as it relied too much on him. During the Thirteenth Party Congress, the PSC even stipulated 
that Deng, who resigned his offices during that same Congress, was to be consulted on all 
important political matters.26 Indeed, it was Deng who selected Jiang Zemin as his 
successor and it was Deng who designated Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, by elevating him, 
at a relatively young age, to the PSC.27 
2. Xi Jinping and His Consolidation of Power 
Whether Xi represents a new trend or simply the next step in an old one, he, unlike 
his predecessors, has moved to consolidate power in the CCP. His efforts have been 
twofold. First, Xi has moved power back to the center of the CCP, shifting decision-making 
from local authorities to Beijing, while simultaneously strengthening the CCP vis-à-vis the 
rest of Chinese population by attempting to make the party the center of economic, social, 
and political life inside the PRC. Second, Xi has attempted to install himself at the center 
of the party, investing more and more of authority he has drawn into the CCP in himself. 
These two simultaneous efforts to centralize power have taken three dominant forms: 
institutional change, ideological reform, and anticorruption efforts. 
                                                 
25 Baum, “The Politics of China.” 399.  
26 Baum, 406. 
27 Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard,” 8. 
10 
With respect to institutional change, Xi has instituted a number of reforms across 
the political-military in order to centralize power in the CCP and center the CCP on himself. 
According Alice Miller, researcher and visiting fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford 
University, attendees of the Third Plenum of the 19th Party Congress (February 2018) and 
the following NPC (March 2018) mandated the most extensive scope and depth of 
institutional reforms “in the entire post-Mao era.” 28 More than sixty in all and covering 
the entire political spectrum, these reforms, as stated in document that set them forth, the 
“Plan of Deepening Reform of Party Institutions,” are meant to “preserve the authority and 
centralized and unified leadership of the party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping 
at the core.” 29 With the broader movement of the centralization of all power in the CCP, 
Xi has begun systemically centralizing the CCP on himself, systematically taking control 
of the most important leading committees and government commissions and 
simultaneously demanded loyalty pledges from the military officers and party leaders.30 
Most telling off all, Xi broke with twenty-five years of tradition at the Nineteenth Party 
Congress and did not name a successor for his position as General Secretary of the CCP, a 
move which, taken in conjunction with the NPC’s decision to eliminate term limits, paves 
the way for Xi to retain two of the three most powerful offices he holds well past the 
traditional ten-year mark. 31 
Xi’s consolidation of power has not been limited to institutional reform but has 
even extended into the ideological arena. Since he first took office in 2012, Xi has 
embarked on a campaign to strengthen the ideology of the CCP by removing elements that 
may subvert its authority, a trend which in and of itself sets him apart from his 
predecessors.32 For example, Xi has implemented a crackdown on higher education in the 
PRC, demanding stronger party control over universities and less emphasis on “Western-
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inspired, liberal ideals.” 33 A large part of the broader ideological crackdown has been the 
Chinese government’s efforts to regulate the internet. The government, at Xi’s behest, has 
attempted to make the internet reflect values and thoughts the party deems fit; in other 
words, the government is attempting make the virtual world reflect the political one.34 
While the CCP has worked to strengthen its ideological hold, Xi has simultaneously 
centered that ideology on himself. Xi has adopted the symbols of power, adopting the title 
of “core” leader and having his theoretical work—“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”—enshrined in the Party Constitution in a manner 
previously reserved only for Mao Zedong.35 
Finally, no description of Xi’s consolidation of power would be complete without 
the examination of Xi’s massive anticorruption campaign. Since Xi’s earliest days as a 
CCP official, he had been focused on combatting corruption, making it a hallmark of his 
political career and one of the first initiative he began upon ascending to the PRC’s top 
posts.36 Anticorruption campaigns are not abnormal in the PRC, but, by many accounts, 
Xi’s is different in both duration and scope. The campaign has lasted well beyond the one- 
or two-year lifespans of its predecessors and it employs more than 800,000 officials 
committed to stamping out corruption.37 And it has been highly effective; more than a 
million party officials have been disciplined in some many, a proportion of which have 
been prosecuted and convicted of graft. 38 Whether or not the campaign itself is true attempt 
to clean up the CCP, a masked effort by Xi to purge his political enemies, or both remains 
a point of debate, but there is no doubt that the anticorruption campaign has paralyzed local 
officials, thereby returning power to the CCP’s center and by extension Xi himself. 
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3. How Did Xi Do It? 
The extent to which Xi has consolidated power is impressive, but it inevitably raises 
the question of how he was able to move away from collective leadership and to the 
centralization of power in the first place. Like all complicated puzzles, there is no single 
answer. Xi seems to have pursued several different avenues to reach his goal of 
consolidating power within the party and within himself. However, broadly speaking, the 
literature suggests that Xi seems to have taken three different pathways to consolidate 
power in the Chinese political system: the elevation of members of Xi’s faction to positions 
of power, Xi’s ability to capitalize on feelings of frustration within the CCP, and 
widespread repression via Xi’s anti-corruption and ideological campaigns.  
According to those who subscribe to the first argument, there are currently two 
major factions within Chinese politics, the Jiang-Xi camp (so named for its main leaders 
Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping) and the Hu-Li camp (named for its main leaders Hu Jintao 
and Li Keqiang).39 The former is increasingly made up of “princelings”—party officials 
who come from the families of revolutionaries or other high-ranking officials—while the 
latter is mostly composed of officials who got their start in the Chinese Communist Youth 
League (CCYL) and lack any revolutionary pedigree.40 During the Eighteenth Party 
Congress in November 2012, the Jiang-Xi camp was able to secure six of the seven spots 
on the Eighteenth PSC, leaving the Hu-Li camp with Li Keqiang as its sole representative.41 
The fact that Xi and his allies controlled the country’s most powerful decision-
making body would have certainly help Xi consolidate power during his first term, if that 
is indeed what is happening. However, according to Cheng Li, because Xi and his allies 
control the PSC this seeming consolidation of power could simply be a model of collective 
leadership that has come under the control of one faction—the Jiang-Xi faction.42 Xi’s 
seemingly iron grip on power is more a product of the fact that Xi and, crucially, his 
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political allies hold six of the seven spots on the country’s most important deliberative 
body, the PSC, as opposed to the consolidation of power in Xi himself.43 Additionally, it 
must be noted that the make-up of the Eighteenth PSC was predominantly conservative, 
meaning that its members would have been open to the leadership consolidation that Xi 
has been carrying out.44 It is certainly plausible that the friendly make-up of the Eighteenth 
PSC certainly helped pave the way for the Xi’s power consolidation. 
If the structure of the factional system of Chinese politics applies, it seems Xi may 
have used his political instincts to capitalize on several well-publicized incidents that 
strengthened his hand and that of his faction and weakened that of his opponents’. The first 
incident was the fall of Bo Xilai—the Chongqing Party Secretary—who was widely seen 
as one of Xi’s main competitors for leadership.45 Xi helped ensure his downfall, but in 
doing so tarnished his faction’s reputation.46 Salvation came in a second incident in which 
the son of CCYL leader Ling Jihua crashed a one million RNB Ferrari in Beijing.47 The 
incident opened the CCYL faction up to attacks concerning the opulent lifestyle of its 
members and significantly tarnished of the power then-President Hu Jintao was to have 
over the Eighteenth Party Congress.48 To further his agenda, Xi may have manufactured a 
third incident by disappearing for two weeks before the Eighteenth Party Congress, perhaps 
forcing Hu to make several concessions, the most significant of which was his decision to 
retire from all three of the main leadership positions instead of remaining as Chairman of 
the CMC.49 Throughout all these incidents, Xi seems to have demonstrated his political 
prowess, and instinct that not only helped him construct a friendly Eighteenth PSC, but 
undoubtedly helped him in his efforts to consolidate power later on.  
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That being said, the decision to eliminate term limits for the Chinese presidency 
and not to name a successor for the position of General Secretary certainly require a 
reconsideration of the argument concerning factional politics, especially considering that 
Xi’s moves seem to be an attempt to reinstitute the type of system that collective leadership 
was meant to replace. Ultimately, no matter the factional affiliation of members of the PSC 
and the Politburo as a whole, the sitting members of the important party and government 
bodies would have had to have been open to the leadership consolidation that Xi has been 
carrying out.50 According the Alice Miller, this shift indeed existed and came about as a 
result of the reform stagnation that occurred under Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. According 
to this view, Xi’s attempts to centralize power have largely been supported by a party that 
seeks to push through important political-economic reform. According, Xi is not acting by 
himself or with a faction; he is acting according to what the party wants, reflecting what is 
perhaps a more robust system of collective leadership than other have argued.  
Xi’s ability to consolidate power was certainly only furthered by the campaigns he 
initiated while in office, namely his anticorruption campaign and his ideological campaign. 
While the anticorruption campaign certainly seems to have had the desired effect, there is 
evidence that it has also been weapon for Xi to use to neutralize his political enemies. As 
Elizabeth Economy, the C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies at the 
Council of Foreign Relations, writes, “During December 2012 through 2014, more than 
twenty of the forty-four officials at the vice-ministerial level or higher whom the CCDI 
had removed had close ties or financial connection with Zhou Yongkang, considering one 
of Xi’s most formidable political adversaries.” 51 She presents further evidence of the 
campaign’s political bent by observing that few officials from the provinces where Xi spent 
his early political career—Zhejiang and Fujian—have been targeted for corruption, nor 
have the firms in which top officials attended the same universities as national leaders.52 
In much the same way, Xi’s ideological campaign seems have had an effect on Xi’s 
opposition. While the campaign to strengthen the ideology of CCP has certainly seemed to 
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have done just that, it has also served to silence many of the party’s critics and, by 
extensions, critics of Xi himself.53 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
In the literature concerning Xi’s centralization of political power, two potential 
explanations stand out. First, it seems likely the internal dissatisfaction of CCP party 
members played a significant role in convincing the party to unite behind Xi and his 
political changes. Second, the sheer length and scope of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
suggests that it is serving a purpose other than to simple rooting out of corruption. While 
there may be other significant explanations in the literature, this thesis will focus on 
evaluating these two because of how they interrelate. Xi may not have been able to even 
embark on the anti-corruption campaign without first firmly establishing party support. 
Therefore, each hypothesis has the potential to tell a similar story, that of a party that 
wanted to change the political system and a leader who, once in office with a mandate to 
do so, developed a tool to do it. The narrative surrounding these explanations is elaborated 
upon below.  
1. Purge by another Name 
Corruption within the ranks of the CCP and PRC officials is a well-documented, 
systemic problem. As such, Chinese leaders have a long history of pursuing corruption, but 
Xi’s anticorruption campaign is exceptional for both its scope and its length.54 At the same 
time, certain trends in the anticorruption campaign suggest that it may be something more. 
Whether it is the fact that the provinces in which Xi worked before he took the top job have 
experienced less corruption cases than others or the fact that many of Xi’s biggest 
perceived rivals have been brought down on corruption charges, Xi’s campaign appears to 
have turned into a selective purge. Using his personal credentials (Xi has a long history of 
pursuing anticorruption efforts) and the Chinese public’s very real frustration with 
corruption, Xi is in the process of eliminating opposition to his political program, targeting 
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those who would presently stand against him. In addition to ending the political careers of 
his rivals, Xi’s campaign has also silenced would-be critics and prevented any official from 
rising up to challenge Xi. Essentially, Xi’s anticorruption campaign is simply a purge by 
another name, one that both silences and removes political enemies. 
2. Internal Dissatisfaction 
While Xi’s anticorruption campaign would certainly help him consolidate power 
once in office, it does little to explain how he amassed the requisite power to embark on 
such a sweeping campaign in the first place. The answer to that puzzle can likely be found 
in the CCP members’ dissatisfaction with several years of collective leadership under Xi’s 
predecessor, President Hu Jintao. Under Hu, the central government became relatively 
ineffective at pursing various policies across the economic and political spectrum due to 
tensions between the central and local governments and the limited individual 
accountability that some believe defines the system of collective leadership.55 Indeed, Li 
quotes an oft-used phrase of the Hu era to make this point—“policies decided at 
Zhongnanhai [do not make] it out of Zhongnanhai.” 56 With such dissatisfaction within the 
party, party leaders would have been open, even encouraging, of Xi’s political program 
and may have even helped him pursue it by installing his allies in the PSC to streamline 
his process of power consolidation. Therefore, at least initially, internal dissatisfaction with 
the system of collective leadership under Hu would have allowed Xi to consolidate power 
in an effort to reestablish a strong central government capable of pursuing a daunting set 
of policies and reforms.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
These two different explanations will be evaluated against the available evidence 
to determine which factor or combination of factors seems most likely to explain how Xi 
was able to quickly and successfully consolidate power. For each hypothesis listed above, 
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a standard of evidence will be set to determine whether the hypothesis is valid. This 
standard will be based on two limiting factors: the evidentiary challenges associated with 
the question and the contemporary nature of the question itself. Given that the CCP is 
notoriously secretive about its inner workings, the evidence available to prove or disprove 
these hypotheses is naturally limited. Therefore, the evidence examined will primarily 
consist of the outward signs of the inner workings of the CCP and the best, educated 
guesses from other authors on the subject. Similarly, the contemporary nature of the 
question limits the amount of work and analysis that has already been done on the subject. 
Taken together, these challenges seem daunting, but that should not prevent a thorough 
examination of the question at hand. The explanation of how Xi consolidated power may 
prove useful in determining the success of any number of policies in other areas and, most 
importantly, the success of the CCP itself. Therefore, the answer to the question of how Xi 
consolidated power in the CCP and the PRC will be an educated conjecture that takes into 
account the full body of evidence available, but a conjecture that is in any case worth 
making. 
In order to define the scope of the research and keep the research related to the 
question, the evidentiary standard for each of the hypotheses mentioned above will be 
defined here. With respect to Xi’s anticorruption efforts, two main pieces of evidence must 
be found in order to prove that Xi’s anticorruption campaign is actually a selective purge. 
The first important body of evidence consists of indications that the purge is indeed 
targeting Xi’s political enemies or those who may challenge him in the future. Such targets 
may include officials with no personal loyalty to Xi, officials who have criticized Xi, 
officials who have enough backing to challenge Xi, or officials from other political 
factions. The second body of evidence will consist of indications that the anticorruption 
campaign is distinct from past campaigns, whether that distinction be in its scope, length, 
or content. Taken together, these different bodies of evidence will support the hypothesis 
that Xi’s anticorruption campaign is actually a selective purge. 
The analysis of the hypothesis that internal dissatisfaction with collective 
leadership under Hu Jintao paved the way for Xi’s consolidation of power (at least initially) 
must naturally begin by establishing the potential causes of the initial dissatisfaction. In 
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order to establish a basis for these grievances, evidence of stalled reform, ineffective policy 
execution, and weak leadership must be produced. After establishing that there was a 
legitimate basis for these grievances, the next step is to analyze how the members of the 
CCP acted on these grievances. In order to confirm this hypothesis, the evidence must 
demonstrate that there was little resistance to Xi’s changes, or that his changes were even 
welcomed, encouraged, and aided by upper echelons of the CCP. Such evidence could take 
the form of indications that the party acquiesced to Xi’s requests at the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Party Congresses or that the party picked Xi because he indicated he would 
pursue a centralization of political power.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis will be organized around the two hypotheses presented here given the 
emphasis on methodically testing several different hypotheses against the available body 
of evidence. This introductory section has already established the theoretical underpinnings 
and significance of the question of how Xi was able to bring about changes in the Chinese 
political system. Chapter II will expand on this analysis, seeking to tell the story of the 
evolution of Chinese politics through an institution lens and providing detailed evidence 
that Xi political changes are actually a break with the past. Chapter III will evaluate the 
evidence concerning the CCP’s support for Xi’s political changes. That discussion will rely 
heavily on evidence from Hu Jintao’s, Xi’s predecessor, time in office in order to test if the 
Chinese leadership were actually dissatisfied with Hu’s ability to implement reform. 
Chapter IV will evaluate if Xi’s infamous anti-corruption campaign is functioning as a 
political purge. In order to do so, quantitative and qualitative analysis will be combined to 
first contextualize Xi’s campaign in the history of anti-corruption efforts in the Reform Era 
and, second, analyze Xi’s campaign on its own merit. Finally, the thesis will conclude with 
an evaluation of how Xi was able to consolidate power in the PRC and how that power 
consolidation may affect the future of the CCP and the PRC. 
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II. FROM CENTRALIZATION TO COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
AND BACK AGAIN: THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE POLITICS 
A. INTRODUCTION: A CYCLE OF POLITICS 
Chinese politics in the era of the PRC and the CCP is best pictured as a pendulum 
swinging between two poles of political liberalization and political tightening. When the 
pendulum swings toward political liberalization, efforts to open up the political space come 
to the fore. When the pendulum swings toward political tightening, the state’s and party’s 
efforts become more repressive and controlling. The Chinese themselves have a term for 
this—the fang-shou cycle—and this cycle has defined Chinese politics since the PRC’s 
founding in 1949.57 While the fang-shou cycle primarily refers to the alternating periods 
of loosening and tightening political control, there is another, broad cycle through which 
Chinese politics passes—the alternating periods of personal and institutional politics.  
Personal politics, as the term implies, can be defined as politics based on a person 
or set of people to whom proximity determines political power. The Maoist era, lasting 
from the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, can best be 
defined as an era of personal politics. Institutional politics, on the other hand, can be 
defined as politics in which rules and norms both determine who the dominant political 
players are and how those players’ can exercise their political power. The era immediately 
succeeding the Maoist era, from roughly 1976 to 2012, can best be defined as an era of 
institutional politics in which rules and norms regarding political processes were developed 
and gradually obeyed. This era can be termed the era of collective leadership, taking its 
name from the institution that defined the politics of the time.  
The current era, from 2012 to the present, is marked by a change in the political 
pendulum, a swing away from some of the rules and norms that have defined collective 
leadership. Whether that change will mark a full-scale return to personal politics on the 
level of the Maoist era remains to be seen, but the swing of the Chinese political pendulum 
has certainly reversed direction. At the very least, the Xi era, named after the current 
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president of the PRC Xi Jinping, has seen a retreat from some long-held norms and the 
changing of some long-adhered-to rules. President Xi had actively worked to maneuver 
himself into a position of power few of his predecessors have achieved in the past. Most 
obviously, he has enshrined his legacy in the CCP’s Constitution and paved the way for 
himself to rule for life if he so desires. However, more clandestinely, he has used the 
institutions of collective leadership to serve his own political purposes, taking over 
unprecedented numbers of small leading groups and utilizing norm-determined retirement 
ages to both remove challengers from power and keep others from arising. He has used the 
powers of the state and party to strengthen his leadership position, passing sweeping 
military and societal reforms while using the party’s vast propaganda apparatus to build 
his own cult of personality. Ultimately, the Xi era is best seen as an era of personal politics, 
albeit a transitional one, in which President Xi Jinping is coopting or overturning 
established rules and norms in order to center the political power in the PRC on him. 
The following will demonstrate that the Xi era is indeed a shift away from the 
institutional politics that defined the previous era. The first section will review the politics 
of the Maoist era followed by a second section that will discuss the transition from that era 
to the era of collective leadership. The third section will review the first era of collective 
leadership, from 1976 to 1989, and define exactly what the institution of collective 
leadership is., A fourth and fifth section review the CCP’s decision to double down on the 
institution of collective leadership and exactly how that effort bore fruit between 1989 and 
2012. Finally, the sixth section will argue that the current era is indeed distinguished from 
the previous one, although not exactly analogous to the Maoist era. Finally, this chapter 
will conclude with a discussion of the questions that inevitably stem from this discussion, 
specifically exactly how Xi has been able to implement these reforms in the first place.  
B. THE MAOIST ERA: 1949 TO 1976 
From the founding of the country on October 1, 1949 until September 9, 1976, the 
politics and governance of the PRC revolved around a single man—Mao Zedong. Mao’s 
rule in the affairs of the CCP and the PRC was unquestionable. He was the ultimate arbiter 
in all decisions regarding the state, party, and military domains. Even those who disagreed 
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with him followed his word to the letter, which in many cases led to disastrous 
consequences for both themselves and the country as a whole. Mao’s power during this 
period was not initially obvious to the casual observer; the CCP and the PRC were able to 
institute some rules of governance and open up the political atmosphere to facilitate the 
goal of collective leadership. Yet this was all done with Mao’s blessing. When Mao 
decided to change course, the façade of collective leadership collapsed in a series of rapid, 
sometimes violent domestic and political changes. Ultimately, the Maoist era of Chinese 
politics can be largely characterized as personal politics, as power within the system 
depended on the proximity one had to Mao given that there were few if any institutions in 
existence to check the chairman’s power. 
The Maoist era began with relative political peace for two reasons: Mao’s 
previously established authority in the CCP (and therefore the country as a whole) and, 
therefore, his decision not to contest to CCP’s efforts to institutionalize collective 
leadership. Beginning almost with the founding of the CCP itself, Mao had slowly been 
building up personal power. His leadership in the CCP, from its founding and darkest days 
during the Long March to the wars against both the Japanese and the Kuomintang, had 
established a personality cult around Mao, such that he had become known as the liberator 
of China. This appeal began translating into structural measures designed to reinforce 
Mao’s power. In 1943, Mao was given authority to make unilateral decision for the party 
in certain policy areas.58 The “Thought of Mao Zedong” was eventually enshrined in the 
CCP’s constitution two years later, in 1945.59 Despite vast personal power, Mao actively 
took steps to institute at least the visage of collective leadership. During the Eighth Party 
Congress in 1956, the first since 1945, the CCP attempted to institute rules of succession 
and was able to facilitate an open discussion between various party members concerning 
the future of the party and the PRC.60 The party even decided to reverse the decision they 
had made eleven years earlier and remove “Thought of Mao Zedong” from the party 
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constitution.61 Yet, as with all things during this era, these decisions had already received 
Mao’s blessing; he acquiesced to the change in the constitution to calm Soviet fears of his 
developing personality cult and, while the dialogue at the Congress was open, it was 
between leaders of whom Mao had already approved.62 
Mao’s leadership in the party eventually translated into leadership of the country. 
On October 1, 1949, it was Mao who announced the establishment of the PRC, anointing 
himself the ruler and personally appointing members of the CCP to positions within the 
government.63 In the beginning, Mao’s power was not immediately obvious as all major 
leaders within the party and the government seemed to be aligned on the goals of the state. 
In September of 1954, the country’s leaders even ratified a new constitution that delegated 
substantial powers to the government and reflected the focus of the party on the 
Sovietization of the country.64 Yet even in that early era when all seemed peaceful, Mao’s 
position as arbiter of CCP and PRC policy shone through. In the lead up to the PRC’s entry 
into the Korean War, the majority of the members of the CCP’s Politburo were against 
intervention in the conflict.65 However, Mao himself had come to the conclusion that the 
PRC would have to get involved to both demonstrate its commitment to the communist 
cause and its commitment to fighting its enemies, and so the PRC entered the war in 
November of 1950.66 Decisions like this, including Mao’s decision to speed up agricultural 
cooperativization in 1955, demonstrated Mao’s power in the political system and 
simultaneously strengthened it on the virtue of his decisions’ success. 
While Mao’s early decisions seem to have simply followed the larger thinking of 
the CCP or, when he decided against the majority, were ultimately successful, his decisions 
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beginning in the late 1950s became increasingly questionable if not outright wrong. The 
fact that he was still able to single-handedly guide the PRC to disaster in both the domestic 
and foreign policies realms without impediment demonstrates the extent to which Mao had 
personalized politics in China and had prevented the formation of any institutions that 
could check his power. Trouble began in 1958 when Mao, with the support of most of the 
party’s other leaders, began pushing for an alternative to the previous Five-Year Plan in 
the form of the Great Leap Forward.67 Initially, when the voices dissent began to call for a 
reversal of the policy to fix the many problems that had arisen, Mao deftly purged the 
dissenters from power.68 However, as the magnitude of the disaster became more and more 
obvious, it was Mao himself who, briefly, became increasingly sidelined by other leaders.69 
However, Mao’s brief fall from power only served to increase his paranoia about his own 
status and power, leading to even darker times for the CCP and PRC.  
In the foreign policy realm, Mao began his plans to once again seize power by 
destroying the close Sino-Soviet relationship in order to pave the way for his domestic 
projects despite the fact that the country was still heavily reliant on Soviet expertise and 
material. He seized on the Soviet criticism of his Great Leap Forward as an excuse to drive 
the two countries apart, calling Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to Beijing to chastise 
him and his country for the paternalistic nature by which they supposedly treated the 
Chinese.70 Soon, Mao was attacking the Soviet Union on all fronts, labeling the country an 
example of social-imperialism and claiming that it was the “bastion of reactionary forces 
in the world.” 71 Mao also leveraged the Sino-Soviet split to increase his power over 
domestic, Chinese politics. Those who disagreed with Mao’s decision to split with the 
Soviets were labelled as “right-wing” and revisionist, and those who objected and remained 
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silent but who Mao suspected of disagreeing with him were forced to become the face of 
the Chinese effort to split with the Soviet Union, as was the case with Deng Xiaoping.72  
Having effectively removed any foreign obstacles to his domestic intentions, Mao 
initiated the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution in 1966. This event, more than perhaps 
any preceding action, demonstrates to extent to which Mao controlled Chinese politics. A 
complete account of the movement is unnecessary here, the crucial point being that it was 
Mao who was single-handedly able to turn to the Chinese masses against the very party he 
had helped found and empower. He created the social forces of the movement and he 
supplied it with its ideology.73 It was Mao from whom leaders of the movement drew their 
legitimacy.74 So long as he was alive, even those who opposed the movement could 
ultimately do nothing to stop it. For ten years, the CCP and the PRC writhed in the chaos 
of the Cultural Revolution, as both the country and the party lacked the institutions to check 
the power of the leader. By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, the politics of the PRC finally 
reflected what had been known all along—Mao had reigned supreme, without checks, 
without balances, without equals, the epitome of personal politics.  
C. FROM MAO TO COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
Mao’s death in 1976 provided an opening for CCP leaders to begin rebuilding the 
party and the state anew. Led by Deng Xiaoping, this process took place in two phases. 
The first phase occurred in the years immediately following Mao’s death, from 1976 to 
1989, a phase that saw the beginnings of collective leadership. The second phase, a 
doubling down on the movement toward collective leadership, lasted from 1989 until 2012 
and occurred as a response to domestic unrest, namely the events surrounding the 
Tiananmen Square protests, and massive geopolitical changes, specifically the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Both these phases are distinguished 
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by a push within the CCP to establish rules and norms to govern the politics of the party 
and the state in order to ensure the success and the survival of both. 
Deng Xiaoping’s rule over the PRC and the CCP began with the Third Plenum of 
the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December of 1978. That 
meeting saw the official start of economic reforms that would turn the PRC into the 
economic powerhouse it is today, but, more relevant for this discussion, the fall from power 
Deng’s predecessor, Hua Guofeng, in all but his titular capacities. To do so, Deng shrewdly 
manipulated media coverage of Hua and his “Two Whatevers”—Hua’s promise to “uphold 
whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao had made and to unswervingly follow whatever 
instructions Chairman Mao gave—to turn elite opinion against Hua.75 His ability to 
manipulate the domestic political conversation, as well as the predisposition of many in the 
Chinese political elite to repudiate Mao after ten years of what was essentially ten years of 
civil war, allowed Deng to achieve great success. By 1981, Hua and his allies were had 
been stripped of all their party and state titles and relegated to the bottom of the Central 
Committee lists.76 
Having firmly secured power, Deng turned his sights from those who had attempted 
to further Mao’s legacy to the legacy itself. Under Deng’s leadership, the CCP began 
separating itself from Mao by staging trials for those involved in the Cultural Revolution 
between November of 1980 and January of 1981.77 All four members of the “Gang of 
Four” were found guilty, with two being sentenced to death (later commuted to life in 
prison) and two being sentenced to terms in prison.78 Attention then turned to the role Mao 
himself had played in the Cultural Revolution. After intense debate, the CCP adopted a 
resolution that placed the blame for the Cultural Revolution squarely on Mao’s shoulders 
at the 6th Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in 1981, stating “The ‘cultural revolution’ 
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which lasted from May 1996 to October 1976 was responsible for the most severe setback 
and heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state, and the people since the founding of 
the People’s Republic. It was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Zedong.” 79 With Mao’s 
legacy firmly dealt with, Deng began to implement actual rules and norms to guide the 
CCP forward. 
D. COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP: 1976 TO 1989 
If the Eleventh Party Congress saw the repudiation of the past, the Twelfth Party 
Congress in 1982 saw the inklings of the future. As part of the move toward power-sharing, 
the party abolished the position of Party Chairman at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982 
in order to ensure no one individual could try to emulate Mao by ascending to that 
position.80 Additionally, the party moved to ban personality cults, stating “The Party 
proscribes all forms of personality cult. It shall be ensured that the activities of Party leaders 
are subject to oversight by the Party and the people, while at the same time upholding the 
standard of all leaders who represent the interests of the Party and the people.” 81 Deng 
simultaneously worked to appoint and train potential successors by giving them official 
offices and responsibilities, thereby implementing an early succession program the likes of 
which Mao never instituted.82 Taken together, these institutional changes represented the 
first moves toward achieving what had long been dreamt of but never attained—collective 
leadership. Collective leadership—best described as “a system with a division of 
responsibilities among individual leaders in an effort to prevent arbitrary decision-making 
by a single top leader”—was not only Deng’s answer to Mao’s personal politics, but a 
long-dreamt-of goal of the CCP.83 With Deng’s ascension to leadership, collective 
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leadership became a reality, an institution reinforced by several more actions on the part of 
the CCP.  
One of the first of these new policies to be implemented was the norm of retiring 
older members of the Politburo. Under Mao, party officials only left their positions through 
purge or death.84 Deng, knowing that such a situation could not continue and wanting clear 
positions for new members in the upper echelons of the party, decided to begin 
implementing a retirement system for older party cadre. Like many of Deng’s economic 
reforms, he developed a temporary, transitional institution called the Central Advisory 
Committee (CAC), a body to which retiring, senior party members would enter after exiting 
office and maintain full salary and power over policy in an advisory capacity.85 First 
implemented at the First Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress, the CAC did little to 
facilitate the retiring of senior leaders in the Politburo (although the Central Committee as 
a whole did experience a turnover rate of sixty percent during that plenum).86 However, 
the CAC would prove its worth as an institution during the Fourth Plenum, in which sixty-
four members of the Central Committee stepped down, including one member of the PSC 
and nine other Politburo members, and again during the Fifth Plenum, in which six 
members of the Politburo stepped down, most of them to be replaced with individuals 
whose average age was fifty.87 
The norm of retirement upon a reaching a set age also facilitated the creation of 
another set of decision-making bodies—leading small groups. Leading small groups were 
not a new innovation to the Chinese political system, as several were established in June 
of 1958 to help with the day-to-day governing of the country.88 However, like many early 
Chinese political institutions, they were abolished when Mao turned the country against 
the party during the Cultural Revolution. As part of his political reform package, Deng 
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reestablished several leading small groups in the wake of the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh 
Party Congress in February of 1980. The Finance and Economy Leading was established 
in 1980 at the Fifth Plenum, the Taiwan Affairs Leading group one month before in January 
of 1980, and the Foreign Affairs Leading Group a year later in 1981.89 By the Thirteenth 
Party Congress in 1987, two other leading small groups had been established and 
leadership of these groups was split between the PSC members.90 In all, the diffusion of 
decision-making power to these groups, accompanied with the newer, better educated 
generation of leaders entering the ranks due to the norm of retirement ages, became one of 
the most telling signs of the institutionalization of collective leadership during this era.  
Deng also facilitated the institution of intra-party democracy within the CCP. 
Again, a long-discussed reform during the Maoist era, intraparty democracy is the concept 
that positions and ranking within the party is determined by a vote of party membership. 
Like the norm of retiring upon reaching a certain age, intra-party democracy was also first 
instituted during the Twelfth Party Congress. Delegates to the Twelfth Party Congress 
members were permitted to add names to and eliminate names from a list of nominees for 
the Central Committee, albeit a list provided by party leadership.91 A fuller evolution of 
this institution was seen at the Thirteenth Party Congress in which CCP members voted for 
members of the Politburo in a competitive election in which the number of candidates was 
larger than the number of Politburo seats.92 
Finally, the CCP under Deng undertook several measures to redefine its 
relationship with the state apparatus. This occurred along two dimensions—legally and 
institutionally. In the legal sphere, the party took steps to subordinate itself to the laws of 
the state, writing into the party constitution that “the Party must conduct activities within 
the limits permitted by the Constitution and the laws of the state.” 93 Accordingly, the NPC 
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of 1982 passed a new constitution for the PRC that augmented its own power and explicitly 
spelled out its own responsibilities in making and implementing laws.94 The new 
constitution also added new restrictions on leadership posts, specifically the 
implementation of term limits for government leaders and a prohibition against serving in 
more than one government leadership post concurrently.95 Institutionally, the party, once 
again under the direction of Deng, began to attempt to distance itself from the government 
in order to better facilitate the economic reforms being undertaken.96 Perhaps the most 
important legacy of this decision was the shifting of responsibility over economic matters 
from the party’s Central Committee to the State Council, where the premier took the 
reins.97 
E. DOUBLING DOWN 
The institutionalization of Chinese politics was accompanied by large changes in 
the economic and governance spheres as well. Taken together, these changes marked a 
massive shift away from the past and, perhaps predictably, led to correspondingly large 
social movements that threatened the rule of the CCP. These stirrings came to a head in 
April and June of 1989 when public demonstrations erupted across the country.98 While 
the focal point of the movement was the large student protests in Tiananmen Square, the 
students represented only a small part of the protests. Urban workers (shimin) and students 
in cities across the country rose up in protest of the CCP’s regime. In response, the CCP 
called in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to swiftly crush the dissenters in Beijing. In 
all, during the PLA’s operation between June third and fourth, between 600 and 1,200 
shimin, students, and soldiers died, with an additional 6,000 to 10,000 injured, but the 
dissenters were crushed in a stunning show of force that ensured CCP rule for the near 
future.99 
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The PRC and the CCP, however, proved to be the exception to this period. While 
the CCP successfully crushed domestic dissent to remain in power, its counterparts in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were not so lucky. On the same day the Chinese were 
clearing Beijing of protests (June 4, 1989), Polish voters peacefully ousted the communist 
regime in their country.100 Other Eastern European communist governments followed, and 
the contagion spread such that, by 1991, the Soviet Union itself had disintegrated into 
fifteen different states. The simultaneous domestic and foreign shocks sparked an intense 
period of soul-searching within the PRC, a period of time during which the CCP sought to 
learn the lessons of their former allies and prepare the party to govern in a new world order.  
Much of the Chinese, post-Tiananmen, post-Soviet analysis concluded that the 
Soviet Union and its client states had fallen largely due to the atrophy of their political 
systems, particularly the stagnation and disintegration of their respective communist 
parties. One of the first analysis to come in the wake of the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe was a piece from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) published in 
1990 that cited “dictatorships…ruling parties divorced from their populace and…the 
overcentralization of the party structure.” 101 Later analysis in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union identified several more factors: “overconcentration of political power in 
top leader; personal dictatorship; failure to replace political leaders systematically; no 
inner-party democracy; special privileges [for the party]; poorly developed mechanism to 
police party members for breach of discipline.”102 In response, the Chinese began to double 
down on the institutionalization of their politics, beginning the second phase of the 
country’s period of institutional politics. 
F. COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP: 1989 TO 2012 
The PRC and the CCP were lucky that the country had already embarked on 
institutional reforms before the crisis period of 1989 to 1991. As such, the regime simply 
had to see these reforms through to their fruition to prevent their regime from succumbing 
                                                 
100 Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 42-45. 
101 Shambaugh, 50.  
102 Shambaugh, Table 4.1. 
31 
to the same pressures that toppled communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. Alas, this was easier said than done. The shocks of the fall of communism were 
able to reverse some reforms; Deng’s push to separate the party from the government was 
all but abandoned for fear that such a division would eventually create a cleavage that could 
bring down the CCP.103 However, the institutionalization of politics in many areas, 
including succession politics, norms concerning age limits, and the strengthening of party 
cadre and state bureaucrats, continued apace.  
Perhaps the most important aspects of the continued institutionalization of Chinese 
politics were the success of leadership transitions at the highest levels of the Chinese 
government post-1989. Deng had attempted see two general secretaries through their full 
terms in office—Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang—but both were booted from office as a 
result of their inability to maintain social stability within the country.104 In response, Deng 
tried again, selecting Jiang Zemin to be “the core of the third generation of leadership.” 
Jiang was named General Secretary during the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth 
Central Committee in June of 1989, appointed CMC chairman in September of that same 
year, and was appointed President of the PRC during the Eighth NPC in 1993.105 Having 
been invested with the three highest office within in the PRC and the CCP, Jiang was 
prepared to succeed Deng. Following Deng’s exit from political life in 1994 (and his 
eventually death in 1997), Jiang was able to reaffirm his position as core leader even 
without Deng’s patronage.  
The more significant transfer of power, however, occurred between Jiang Zemin 
and his successor, Hu Jintao. The Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002 saw the peaceful 
transfer of power from Jiang to Hu in the form of the office of General Secretary with the 
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Presidency being transferred the following March at the Tenth NPC.106 It is notable that 
Jiang did not transfer the CMC Chairmanship to Hu until 2004. However, this timing was 
in accordance with the staggered method by which Jiang himself received his state and 
party positions, and therefore it can be argued that such timing was actually in keeping 
with the norm of succession.107 By 2012, the CCP and the PRC had successfully 
experienced two significant leadership successions. The transition of power between Hu 
Jintao and Xi Jinping that year made it three, lending credence to the idea that the politics 
of succession had been successfully institutionalized.  
Successful changes in power did not only occur in the highest office. Indeed, the 
norm of retirement ages was beginning to have an even greater effect. The Fourteenth Party 
Congress saw the elimination of the CAC and a corresponding liberation of the younger, 
newer members of the Central Committee and the Politburo.108 Party Congresses between 
1982 and 2002 saw turnover rates in the Central Committee averaging around sixty 
percent.109 High turnover also meant the emergence of a new generation of leaders, the 
third generation of leadership. The average age of Central Committee members had 
dropped from sixty-five at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1977 to fifty-five at the Sixteenth 
Party Congress in 2002.110 Additionally, the percentage of Central Committee members 
with a college degree had risen from twenty-five percent to ninety-eight percent during that 
same period.111 Subsequent Party Congresses continued these trends, leading to both a 
better educated and younger ruling elite in the third and fourth generations of leadership. 
The development of the party cadre allowed for a flourishing of leading small 
groups, especially under Hu Jintao. By the time of Hu’s ascendance to the leading offices, 
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the number of the primary leading groups had expanded from five to eight.112 Similar to 
the pre-1989 collective leadership period, the leading small groups, were once again 
divided between members of the PSC, with Hu only ever controlling three of the eight 
leading small groups throughout his time in office.113 The membership lists of these groups 
also reflected the strengthening of norms surrounding the retirement age; shuffling of 
members of these small groups generally coincided with the ascendance of new members 
to the Central Committee during party congresses.114 
Ultimately, by 2012, the CCP had arguably achieved many of the institutional 
reforms it had set out to achieve. Top party leaders had overseen several successful 
transitions of power. The composition of officers in both the party and the state was 
younger and more technically equipped to handle the challenges of the large, growing 
country. Leading small groups allowed power over policy to be distributed among top 
officials within the CCP and the PRC. Political power was, for all intents and purposes, 
held collectively and decisions were made accordingly.  
G. THE XI ERA: FROM 2012 TO THE PRESENT DAY 
The Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012 marked yet another turning point in the 
currents of Chinese politics. It was during this time that Hu Jintao’s successor, Xi Jinping, 
assumed the positions of power. While Xi was initially viewed as a liberalizing reformer 
who planned to continue the institutionalization of Chinese politics, his rule has turned out 
to be very different. Xi’s reign to date, has seen a crackdown on political and social 
freedoms and a recentralization of the party in the lives of everyday Chinese citizens and 
in the government of the PRC. More importantly though, Xi has begun to turn back some 
of the reforms that characterized the institutional politics of the earlier era. Such changes 
encompass the obvious—changes to term limits, party ideology, and personal power—but 
also the less apparent—military and personnel reforms. Taken together, these reforms 
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represent a change from the previous era, although not necessarily a complete return to the 
personal politics of the Maoist era.  
The most obvious sign of Xi’s return to personal politics, indeed the one that has 
received the most attention over the last few years, was the abolition of presidential term 
limits in PRC’s constitutions by the NPC in March of 2018.115 The significance of this 
move, however, is only fully understood in the context of another, more important move 
by Xi—his decision not to appoint a successor to the office of General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 
October of 2017—a decision that broke with the longstanding precedent that successors 
are designated five years before their ascendance to the role of party and state leader.116 
Given that it is the party, not the state, that takes precedence in the PRC, Xi’s decision to 
retain his party office is more significant than his decision to retain his state ones. In fact, 
the amendments to the PRC’s constitution can be seen as the natural result of Xi’s decision 
to retain his party offices, a move necessary to maintain the letter of the norm that leaders 
in the PRC and the CCP hold the party’s and country’s three most important offices 
(General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the CMC). However, the spirit of the 
norm—that the constitutional limits on presidential terms would also limit the time in other 
offices—has certainly been broken, and Xi has thereby signaled that he intends to rule for 
at least one more term (from 2022 to 2027) if not beyond.  
Corresponding to the idea that it is the changes within the party, not the state, that 
matter more for the governance of the country, the party has also promoted Xi and 
advanced his agenda in several other ways. Beginning in the Eighteenth Party Congress in 
2012 and continuing in the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017, the CCP has consistently 
stacked the Politburo and the Politburo Central Committee with Xi’s close, factional allies 
and shunned those who had the potential to challenge his rule. At the Eighteenth Party 
Congress, Xi and his allies secured six of the seven spots in the PSC, leaving only one 
                                                 
115 Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, “China’s Legislature Blesses Xi’s Indefinite Rule. It Was 
2,958 to 2,” The New York Times, October 15, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/world/asia/china-xi-constitution-term-limits.html. 
116 Economy, The Third Revolution, 10-12. 
35 
member of the opposition, Premier Li Keqiang, in the nation’s highest ruling body.117 The 
Nineteenth Party Congress saw even more success for Xi. Xi and his allies secured five of 
the six spots on the PSC as well as eighteen of twenty-spots on the Politburo as a whole.118 
Outside of the Politburo, Xi was able to position several of his political allies in key 
positions across nearly all of China’s thirty-one provinces, ensuring Xi’s influence is able 
to spread outside of Zhongnanhai, a problem Chinese leaders have consistently 
encountered when trying to implement policies across the country.119 Xi’s power to appoint 
his allies to prominent positions is not only confined to high level and regional posts. In 
all, Xi has been able to stack positions, opened because of the strong norms surrounding 
retirement age, at all levels of the government and the party with allies, ensuring a political 
coalition that will overpower those who oppose it for many years to come.  
Many leading small groups, once a prominently symbol of collective leadership, 
have also come under Xi’s sway. During Xi’s first term, he led more leading small groups 
than Hu ever did during his terms (six of eleven versus four of ten by one count, six of 
eleven versus three of eight by another).120 Additionally, Xi arguably controlled the most 
important groups in the current political moment, including a new group on 
“Comprehensive Deepening Reform,” and, perhaps more significantly, the Finance and 
Economy leading small group, an area which had previously been reserved for the premier 
in his role as the steward of the Chinese economy.121 More recently, many of these small 
groups have been elevated to the level of commissions, including the groups on 
comprehensive deepening reform, cybersecurity, and foreign affairs, while the elevation of 
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the group on finance and economy is in the process of doing so.122 Changing the status of 
these groups to committees would institutionalize their power over the government, and, 
as may be expected, Xi leads all four.123 
In addition to the many favorable personnel changes, the party has also moved to 
cement Xi’s legacy and power in more symbolic ways. At the Sixth Plenum of the 
Eighteenth Party Congress in October of 2016, the CCP bestowed upon Xi the title of “core 
of the leadership.” 124 To be fair, Jiang Zemin also obtained the title of “core,” but Xi is 
certainly the first leader to do so himself (Jiang was given the title by Deng) and obtain the 
title without qualification (Jiang was referred to as “core of the third-generation 
leadership”).125 Additionally, the party, at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017, 
enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” 
into the party constitution.126 The use of Xi’s name is the most significant aspect of the 
change here; both Jiang and Hu had left their respective imprints on party ideology, but 
only Deng and Mao, in the form of “Mao Zedong Thought” and “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” 
were actually named.127 Indeed, while the official name of Xi Jinping’s ideological 
contribution is strong and unwieldy, the state propaganda machine is already hard at work 
contracting the phrase to its logical derivative—“Xi Jinping Thought—with over 23 forms 
of “Xi Thought” appearing tens of thousands of times in publications across the PRC.128 
The personnel and ideological changes in the CCP, taken together, indicate a sweeping 
consolidation of party power in the hands of Xi Jinping.  
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Nor has Xi been content with simply convincing the political elite of China. Xi, 
unlike his predecessors, has also worked to build his own version of a cult of personality, 
leveraging the CCP’s substantial control over domestic media to do the job. In the first year 
and a half of his first term, Xi was mentioned two times more in the first eight pages of the 
People’s Daily and twenty percent more on the front page alone when compared to his two 
immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.129 More recently, the People’s Daily 
ran a full five-page piece to commemorate the anniversary of the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee and the start of the reform period in which Xi was mentioned 
127 times while Deng, the man who started the reform period, was mentioned sixty times, 
less than half as many as Xi.130 State and party organizations are not the only ones building 
Xi’s narrative; everyday Chinese citizens have also had a hand in it through Xi’s constant 
promotion in Chinese social media. Songs, such as Xi Dada Loves Peng Mama, and poems, 
such as General Secretary, the sight of your back and the look of my eyes, are prolific on 
sanctioned social media platforms.131 Chinese netizens also latch on to Xi’s carefully 
choreographed public appearances. Xi’s visit to the Qingfeng Steamed Bun Shop in Beijing 
in 2013 garnered substantial social media attention, as did his visit to a popular Beijing 
shopping district later that year. And even if such interactions with ordinary citizens are 
commonplace in Chinese politics, the fact that the Qingfeng Steamed Bun Shop has since 
become a tourist attraction for ordinary Chinese citizens is a testament to Xi’s hold over 
the Chinese psyche.132 Such the constant promotion of Xi has had an effect; local 
politicians’ praises and pledges of fealty to Xi reached such alarming levels that party 
leadership has supposedly issued guidelines restricting certain phrases used to praise 
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Xi.133Although reminiscent of Mao’s own personality cult, Xi’s persona is clearly 
different, with his image being crafted to reflect that of an everyday man, whereas Mao 
was presented as above all others.134 Therefore, while Xi certainly has popular appeal, he 
will likely never reach the power Mao had with the masses. Yet, Xi’s own cult is certainly 
a break with his immediate predecessors, who guarded against any semblance of a cult of 
personality. 
Xi’s popularity with the public and his hold over the CCP has allowed him to push 
through a number of reforms in nearly all sectors of Chinese life, reforms aimed at 
centralizing the CCP in Chinese society, military, and government. By definition, given Xi 
push to centralize the party on himself, this means centralizing the Chinese society, 
military, and government on him. Many of the reforms focused on strengthening the party’s 
role in society are focused on how the Chinese people receive and process information, 
specifically on the internet and on the educational system. Over the past decade, the PRC 
has built a censorship leviathan meant to control the domestic dialogue over the internet. 
While political censorship of the internet is nothing new, Xi’s active role in that process is. 
He now chairs the Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group, a position 
previously reserved for the premier.135 He has also reinvigorated the bureaucratic arms of 
the censorship leviathan, creating the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) out of 
the State Internet Information Agency and placing the administrative offices of his leading 
group within the CAC to ensure full control over both the policy and its execution.136 
Within the realm of education, the CCP, under the direction of Xi, has targeted a variety of 
institutions, from universities to think tanks, for teaching and propagating Western values, 
and has deployed new methods, from new textbooks to new political screening systems for 
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university positions, to strengthen the CCP ideological line.137 On a whole, these reforms 
seem to have reached deep into the lives of Chinese citizens, demonstrating the CCP’s new 
focus on asserting itself more prominently in life in China.  
The military, too, has been a focus of Xi’s reforms and the changes within the 
structure and workings of the PLA reflect the centrality of Xi to the reform package. In the 
first place, Xi’s reforms of the PLA slimmed down the CMC from eleven to seven 
members, creating a smaller group at the top of the military chain of command, the smallest 
since the 1930s.138 Arguably more significant than the number on the CMC is its 
composition with respect to both the people and the interests formally represented. At least 
two of the CMC members seem to have personal ties to Xi, and of the seven offices held 
by the new CMC members, two—the Political Work Department Director and the 
Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary—aim to ensure the military remains loyal to 
the CCP.139  
One other indication of Xi’s increasing power over the military is his central role 
in how these reforms came about. In pushing these reforms through, Xi has emphasized his 
ultimate power over the PLA by highlighting the “CMC chairman responsibility system,” 
which states that as the CMC Chairman, Xi is ultimately responsible for military matters.140 
The idea of the CMC chairman responsibility system was ultimately enshrined in the party 
constitution during the 19th party congress, ensuring its staying power for years to come.141 
Additionally, Xi, unlike his immediate predecessor Hu, has been personally involved in the 
promotion and assignment process for senior officers, allowing him, if he so desires, to 
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promote those with personal loyalty to him.142 On the issue of loyalty, Xi has also taken to 
demanding loyalty pledges from senior PLA leaders.143 Whether Xi’s personal 
involvement in the process of reform of the PLA is by necessity (the reforms could not 
happen with his involvement) or by design (the reforms are designed to make Xi a central 
figure in military matters) is up for debate, but the fact remains that, as a result of his 
personal involvement, the entire structure of the PLA and success of the accompanying 
reforms now rely on him. 
H. CONCLUSION: A CARROT AND A STICK 
Clearly, Xi Jinping has embarked on massive sweeping reforms of the CCP, the 
PLA, the PRC, and the very structure of Chinese society. The very nature of these reforms 
has represented a change in direction, a crest in the pendulum’s swing toward institutional 
politics and its new movement back toward personal politics. That being said, it is doubtful 
that Xi’s reforms will return the PRC to the Maoist era, when one man ruled supreme. The 
fact that Xi amended the state constitution’s limit on presidential terms rather than ignore 
it entirely represents the staying power of some of the lessons and reforms that have carried 
over from the previous era. But the sheer scale and depth of the reforms under Xi and their 
ultimate effect—the placement of Xi at the center of Chinese political life—, whether 
intentional or not, certainly represents the arrival of a new era of Chinese politics.  
What remains to be seen is exactly how Xi was able to centralize the party on his 
own person and centralize Chinese society on the party. Changing the direction of the 
Chinese political sphere is no easy task, as the sheer size and depth of Chinese politics 
means that it develops a momentum all its own. As in all governments, bureaucrats 
fastidiously defend their entrenched interests while leaders, elected or not, do all they can 
to cling to power. As in all parties, ideology dictates the disposition of some, patronage 
networks the disposition of others. And the sheer size of both the party and the government 
in the PRC, being responsible for almost a billion and half people or one-sixth of the 
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world’s population, means that any attempt to change the status quo is a massive 
undertaking.  
Deng Xiaoping was able to change the political direction of China for two reasons. 
First, Mao’s Cultural Revolution had brought China to its knees and both the political elite 
and the people of China were ready for a change. Deng capitalized on this desire for change 
and pushed through several reforms in the political sphere meant to stabilize and 
institutionalize politics of the era. Second, his efforts were renewed when the CCP 
witnessed the fall of their fellow communist regimes and the near-toppling of their own 
between 1989 and 1991. As such, Deng’s early reforms were reinvigorated and the CCP 
and PRC were able to establish strong rules and norms concerning succession, decision-
making, party and government offices, and the triangular relationship between the state, 
the people, and the party.  
Xi Jinping has undoubtedly changed many of those rules and norms developed 
under Deng. However, how he was able to do so is not clear, although two possibilities 
immediately come to mind. First, like Deng, Xi may have utilized a carrot, capitalizing on 
elite discontent with the inability of Xi’s predecessor to push forward what were perceived 
as necessary economic reforms in order to convince the political elite that centralizing 
power in him would allow the country to execute those reforms. Second, Xi may have 
employed a stick, a sweeping anti-corruption campaign distinguished from past efforts by 
its scope, its scale, and its ability to target individuals at all levels of the party and the 
government. Together, these two methods may have combined to ensure Xi’s success in 
centralizing power. The following two chapters will rigorously test these hypotheses, 
placing each in the proper context and examining if these factors played a role in changing 
the direction of the pendulum. 
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III. XI JINPING, A WELCOME STRONGMAN 
A. INTRODUCTION: A NEW CONSENSUS? 
One of the biggest obstacles to institutional reform within any organization are the 
members of the institution themselves. Having grown accustomed to and having benefitted 
from certain rules and norms within an organization, the membership will likely be 
reluctant to change the status quo. Xi Jinping’s reform efforts, although part of a cycle in 
Chinese politics, are likely no different in that they too would have faced strong opposition 
from entrenched members of the CCP. These members of both the state and the party within 
the PRC have few incentives to change the organization because, in doing so, they risk the 
benefits of membership to which they have grown accustom. However, we have not seen 
a dramatic backlash to the agenda and the policies of power centralization within the CCP. 
This lack of backlash indicates that something else may be at work in the political system 
of the PRC. While the membership of an organization will in general prefer the status quo, 
this preference not static. Outside catalysts can change membership preferences. In Xi’s 
effort to change the Chinese political system, the inability of his predecessor Hu Jintao to 
carry out crucial economic reforms seems to have been one such catalyst, changing the 
preferences of CCP members from an affinity for institutional politics to a desire for 
personal politics.  
Such a narrative is in direct contrast with the story that Xi has forced political 
reforms on the CCP and the PRC as a whole. Both cannot be correct, but both have been 
used to explain Xi’s ability to carry out his own political program within the CCP. This 
chapter will evaluate the evidence for the assertion that Xi’s changes had the backing of 
the CCP. The following chapter will evaluate one critical component of the narrative that 
Xi has forced changes in the Chinese political system—the anticorruption campaign.  
To demonstrate Xi had the CCP’s backing to initiate his political reforms, it must 
be demonstrated that there was reason for Chinese leaders to be frustrated with reform 
under Hu, that Chinese leaders were indeed frustrated with the status quo, and that they 
pushed for change within the Chinese political system. Crucially, if Chinese leaders were 
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truly reacting to Hu’s failure to push through economic reforms, it must be demonstrated 
that they viewed this failure not necessarily as a result of Hu’s weak leadership, but 
certainly as an indictment of the system of collective leadership as a whole. There seems 
to be ample evidence to support all these points. In the first place, Hu embarked on several 
major economic reforms but, by the end of this second term, he had failed to deliver. 
Second, Chinese leaders reacted quickly to the reform stagnation by diagnosing the 
problem—the weak leadership of then CCP and PRC leader Hu. Hu, while a capable 
technocrat, has been portrayed as a status quo leader, reluctant to embark on any major 
reforms that would have ran up against the entrenched interests of the state. The perception 
that Hu failed to push through necessary reforms during his decade in power was so 
widespread that many observers call his period of rule China’s “ten lost years” or China’s 
“lost decade.” 144 
Hu’s failure to implement reforms facilitated the second rationale in the decision to 
centralize power—dissatisfaction with the system of collective leadership. Because the 
system of collective leadership became closely associated with Hu and his personal 
leadership, the CCP seems to have conflated the two and doomed them both. In the lead 
up to the Eighteen Party Congress, Chinese leaders repeatedly expressed a desire to 
centralize political power in order to better implement political-economic reforms by 
overcoming special interests in Chinese society. Even a joint Chinese government-World 
Bank study suggested the establishment of a centralized, all-powerful reform committee to 
push through necessary reforms in face of strong opposition.145 This general feeling only 
makes sense as a reaction to the perceived failure of the collective leadership system. In an 
effort to revitalize the reform process, Chinese leaders actively chose to shift away from 
such a system. 
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On the other hand, the factual evidence suggests that there was more at work in 
China than simply Hu’s weak leadership. Indeed, the CCP may have misdiagnosed the 
problem. Hu may have been a weak leader, but he also presided over the world’s worst 
economic disaster—the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)—which would have set reforms 
back in the PRC no matter who held the top positions in country. Yet almost entirely absent 
from the CCP’s narrative surrounding the ineffectiveness of Hu and the collective 
leadership system is the effect of both the GFC and the Chinese response to it had on the 
ability of Hu to carry out important economic reforms. In fact, it is quite the opposite. 
Chinese leaders clearly saw their response to the GFC as a great success, praising to role 
of economic centralization in preventing economic disaster. This profuse praise of the 
Chinese response and the idea that the country came out relatively unharmed by the GFC 
gave Chinese leaders all the more reason to blame Hu and the political system he presided 
over for the stagnation of economic reforms.  
After examining the available evidence, it is clear that Chinese leaders were 
frustrated by said economic reform stagnation, as evidenced by their repeated calls in the 
lead-up to the Eighteenth Party Congress for a change in the status quo. This frustration, 
which may have been limited to dissatisfaction with Hu himself in other contexts, expanded 
to included dissatisfaction with the system of the collective leadership because that system 
became more institutionalized under Hu and therefore more associated with him. This 
dissatisfaction with the current system, combined with a selective understanding of the 
Chinese success during the GFC, led the CCP to push to centralized power at the Eighteenth 
Party Congress in order to revive economic reform, allowing Xi to begin his process of 
power centralization upon taking office. However, although the party ultimately began the 
correct treatment for their diagnosis of the problem, the CCP’s diagnosis itself was 
incorrect. Although the GFC and the Chinese response to it played a larger role in the 
reform stagnation than Hu or the system of collective leadership did, the CCP elected to 
praise their response to the GFC crisis as a success, preventing them from correctly 
perceiving the flaws within their own political-economic system.  
This chapter will assess the narrative that Chinese leaders fixated on the idea that 
Hu Jintao and the system of collective leadership prevented the implementation of essential 
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reforms and therefore gravitated toward Xi Jinping’s program of centralized leadership. In 
order to test the validity of this assertion, I will begin with a brief history of economic 
reform in China as it relates to Chinese politics, demonstrating that reform up until Hu 
Jintao had been relatively easily. Next, I will examine Hu Jintao’s tenure, beginning with 
Hu’s blueprint for reform and continuing on with a discussion concerning why that reform 
failed. I will compare competing narratives—a failure of leadership and an inevitable 
failure—and demonstrate that, while the latter is likely more accurate, Chinese leaders 
settled on the former as the definitive explanation. Finally, I will discuss what arose from 
the Chinese leadership’s impression that collective leadership caused reform failure, 
namely calls for a centralization of power in the lead up to the Eighteenth Party Congress 
and Xi Jinping’s answers to those calls.  
B. THE STRUGGLES OF REFORM 
Reform in the PRC has never been easy, but it has definitely been harder for some 
leaders than it has been for others. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Reform Era 
begin with Deng Xiaoping and his efforts to reshape the Chinese political-economic 
system. On the political side, Deng worked to shift politics away from the personal politics 
of Mao and to the institutional politics of the Reform Era. At the same time, Deng worked 
to recreate the Chinese economy, attempting to transition from a state-run economy to a 
market-driven one. As evidenced in the last chapter, reforms along both these axes were 
difficult. Deng was forced to overcome conservatives at every step and reform was not a 
smooth process, but rather a stop and go affair.146 But Deng, thanks to his own 
revolutionary credentials, the backlash to the Cultural Revolution, and the fear that the fall 
of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR had instilled in Chinese leaders, 
was successful in pursuing reform in both the political and economic directions. That 
momentum carried over to the PRC’s and CCP’s next leader, Jiang Zemin. 
Jiang, and importantly his premier, Zhu Ronji, were also able to successfully pursue 
reform in both the economic and political dimensions. Politically, Jiang was able to 
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leverage his appointment by Deng (along with the fact that Deng survived to continue to 
oversee political reform until 1995) in order to continue the process of institutionalizing 
Chinese politics. Indeed, Jiang oversaw the ascension of a younger, better educated set of 
leaders to positions of power in the Chinese politics system. Economically, reform had 
become much more difficult, as Jiang and Zhu were running up against several of the 
problems that would bedevil their successors mere years later. The backlash to economic 
reform from conservatives and special interests alike required shrewd measures by both 
Jiang and Zhu to achieve the necessary reform goals. Even then, their efforts came close to 
being defeated a number of times.  
Most prominently, Jiang and Zhu leveraged the desire of Chinese leaders to enter 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to drive economic reform. The PRC initially applied 
to join the WTO (technically, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs or GATT at the 
time) in 1986 but were not able to come to an accession agreement with the major countries 
in the WTO—the U.S., the E.U., and Japan—until November of 1999.147 These countries, 
concerned that PRC’s non-market economy would jeopardize their own competitive 
advantage in the global marketplace, demanded that the PRC make accession 
“commercially viable” by implementing a series of reforms to their own economy.148 Jiang 
and Zhu were able to leverage this increasing international pressure to push through crucial 
economic reforms in within the PRC, but this did not occur without backlash. 
Conservatives, incited by the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
and several initial failures to actually sign an accession agreement in early 1999, come out 
strong against Zhu and, by extension, Jiang. Criticism reached such a fevered pitch that it 
appeared further reform and WTO accession itself would be put off for a number of years. 
Luckily, Jiang and Zhu were able to regain control of the party within a few weeks and 
signed an agreement in November of 1999 assuring accession in December of 2001.  
While the PRC’s entry into the WTO is undoubtedly an important step in Chinese 
political-economy, the reforms that accompanied that accession are arguably of greater 
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importance generally and of greater significance within this study. Without the role 
international pressure, Jiang and Zhu may have been hard-pressed to actually maintain the 
momentum of economic reform that Deng had started. Just a few years later, Jiang and 
Zhu’s successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao would be forced confront the same challenges 
in their push for reform. However, Hu and Wen would lack the leverage that the WTO 
accession gave Jiang and Zhu, and the consequences of that were unsurprising. 
C. REFORM AND CONSOLIDATION UNDER HU 
When Hu Jintao took power after the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, hopes were 
high that he would continue the reforms that his predecessors had started. Indeed, Hu 
expressed a willingness to do just that. Speaking directly to the Chinese people in a 
nationally televised address during the 10th NPC in March of 2003, he committed himself 
and the leadership to further reforms that would open up the country both politically and 
economically and facilitate the growth of the PRC into a prosperous nation.149 Hu had been 
given put on solid ground to do so. The smoothness of his own transition to power was a 
clear indication that, at least at that time, the institutions meant to govern Chinese politics 
were solidifying. Economically, Jiang and Zhu’s work to bring the PRC into the WTO was 
beginning to pay off as Hu entered office. Between 2000 and 2010, the PRC’s average 
GDP growth rate was just over ten percent per year, with a huge spike in growth occurring 
between 2004 and 2007 as WTO accession finally began to take effect.150 
That being said, when Hu took office in 2002, the challenges of success were 
quickly becoming apparent. To his credit, Hu was able to quickly identify these challenges 
and worked quickly to identify solutions to deal with them. Foremost among these 
challenges was the problem of unequal economic growth. While the PRC was indeed 
growing at an average of ten percent throughout that decade, that growth was not spread 
equally across all of Chinese society. The divide primarily fell across distinct geographical 
lines. Growth was concentrated in the coastal, urban regions of the country and barely 
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reached into the inland, rural regions. As such, the disparities between different parts of 
Chinese society began to grow and the Gini coefficient—a measure of wealth inequality 
within a country—reached 0.46 in 2010. In addition to the large problem of inequality, Hu 
and his fellow leaders were confronted with environmental degradation and social unrest, 
all resulting from the massive growth in Chinese GDP throughout their time in office. 
To address these growing challenges, Hu embarked on a promising series of 
reforms when he took office. Like all Chinese leaders before him, Hu attempted to codify 
his own thoughts on governance and implement a guiding ideology for his time in office. 
That ideology came in the form of the “scientific development concept.” 151 As he 
articulated in September of 2003,  
It is necessary to adopt a scientific development concept of coordinated, all-
around, and sustainable development, actively explore a new development 
path that conforms to reality…combine the promotion of urban 
development with the promotion of rural development…and strive to take 
a civilized development path characterized by the development of 
production, a well-off life, and a good ecological environment. 152  
Essentially, Hu was aiming to promote policies that would ensure equitable, 
manageable growth as opposed to policies that were singularly focused on economic 
growth at the expense of all else. During the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Central 
Committee held in October of 2003, the upper echelons of the CCP blessed Hu’s approach, 
signing on to his ideas if not Hu’s moniker for them.153 They accordingly adopted a plan 
that focused on spreading the benefits of economic growth, dealing with its environmental 
consequences, and, perhaps most importantly, moving the basis for Chinese economic 
growth away from exports and investment and to domestic consumption.154 
If the scientific development concept was meant to reorient the direction of the 
PRC’s growth, the concept of a “socialist harmonious society” was meant to deal with the 
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social problems already arising from the PRC’s inequitable growth. By 2006, the Gini 
coefficient in China had reached 0.46, a sign of rampant inequality across the country.155 
The Chinese people themselves were noticing; between 1993 and 2005, the number of mass 
incidents of protest across the country had grown tenfold, from 8,700 incidents to 
87,000.156 To address these problems, the Sixth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central 
Committee in October of 2006 passed a resolution focused on “major issues concerning 
the building of socialist harmonious society.” 157 The product of two long years of Hu 
Jintao’s work and lobbying, the resolution aimed to correct the growth imbalances between 
the rural and urban areas of the country, to redress “imbalances in regional development 
after two decades’ emphasis on fast economic growth in China’s coastal regions.” 158 
In addition to lofty political reform, Hu’s tenure also saw the further consolidation 
of institutional politics in the form of collective leadership. Twenty-two of twenty-five 
members of the PSC ushered in during the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002 as part of the 
leadership change between Jiang and Hu had college degrees.159 The average age of the 
Sixteenth Party Congress PSC member was sixty, down from the Fifteenth Party Congress 
PSC’s average of sixty-three, while, with respect to the Central Committee as a whole, the 
average age fell from 55.9 to 55.4.160 Also of note are the structural changes to the Politburo 
and the PSC itself. The number of members on the Politburo was expanded from twenty-
four to twenty-five between the Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Party Congresses, while, over 
that same period, the number of members on the PSC was expanded from seven to nine, 
reflecting a diffusion of decision-making power to more party members.161 Under Hu, the 
institutions of collective leadership that Deng Xiaoping had established early in the reform 
                                                 
155 Miller, 528-599. 
156 Miller, 528-599. 
157 Alice Lyman Miller, “Hu Jintao and the Sixth Plenum,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 20 
(February 28, 2007): 1-12. 
158 Miller, 1-12. 
159 Miller, “Dilemmas of Globalization and Governance,” 528-599. 
160 Miller, 528-599; Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era. 
161 Miller, “Dilemmas of Globalization and Governance,” 528-599; Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi 
Jinping Era, 51. 
51 
era were truly coming into their own, becoming more and more associated with Hu and 
therefore with his eventually failure to implement reform. 
Discussion of the power structure within the Chinese media reflected this new 
emphasis on collective leadership under Hu. Under Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, 
Chinese media referenced the party leadership by naming Jiang as the core leader, usually 
in the formulation of “the Party Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin as the core 
leader.” 162 Contrary to their practices under Jiang, the Chinese media under Hu eliminated 
the moniker of “core leader” instead opting for the formulation “the Party Central 
Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as general secretary.” 163 Furthermore, the Chinese 
media occasionally referred to the leadership team under Hu as the “Hu-Wen leadership,” 
a unique formulation that had not been seen in Chinese media until that time.164 Clearly, 
the state was making efforts to further the consolidation of collective leadership and those 
efforts became more pronounced under Hu.  
Hu’s two reform concepts—scientific development and socialist, harmonious 
society—formed the basis of Hu’s aspirational reform goals, and the consolidation of 
institutional politics early in his tenure gave his initial rule a tinge of optimism. However, 
as Hu entered his second term as leader of both the PRC and CCP in 2007, factors 
originating both within and outside of his control made it impossible for him to actually 
pursue his lofty economic goals and made the consolidation of collective leadership during 
his tenure a political liability. In fact, in contrast with his first term, Hu did not announce 
any new reform initiatives during his second term, indicating a clear stall in the reform 
process, especially on the economic front.165 This stall in reform can be explained by two 
separate variables. First, the GFC and the PRC’s response to it may have prevent Hu from 
following through on many of his economic reforms. Second, the system of collective 
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leadership, which seemed to consolidate during Hu’s time in office, may have resulted in 
such a diffusion of power across the Chinese political system that Hu was unable to push 
through economic reforms. Both these explanations will be evaluated in the following 
sections to both ascertain which factor actually caused the stall in reform and understand 
which factor Chinese leaders believed caused the stall in reform. 
D. AN INEVITABLE FAILURE: THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
To the casual observer, the PRC and its leaders seemed to have weathered the GFC 
of 2007 and 2008 relatively well. The country rapidly rebounded from a brief economic 
slump and continued its stellar economic growth despite the anemic growth across much 
of the developed world. From such a vantage point, it does not seem that the GFC had 
much of an effect on Hu’s policy implementation. However, digging deeper, it soon 
becomes apparent that the strategies the government used to prevent economic catastrophe 
in late 2007 and 2008 may have spelled doom for Hu’s reform agenda. Such policies 
reinforced economic sectors and continued economic practices that Hu was attempting to 
reform with his policies. Ultimately, Hu may have spelled his own political doom, 
succeeding at saving the Chinese economy (and arguably the CCP and the government) 
but dooming his reform agenda in the process.  
Within the PRC, the collapse of the American economy and the world economy 
more broadly led to the depressed exports, as consumption in developed countries rapidly 
decreased. Exports fell 2.2 percent in November and December of 2008, a rapid turnaround 
considering the eighteen percent growth in exports just a month before.166 Similarly, 
industrial production fell from an 8.2 percent growth rate in October to a 5.4 percent growth 
rate in November.167 Seeing the indicators of an impending economic collapse due to a 
collapse in the demand for exports, the Chinese government acted swiftly. On November 
5, 2008, the PRC’s State Council met and announced a four trillion-yuan ($586 billion) 
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stimulus package to be distributed primarily through investment.168 At the same time, the 
central elements of the CCP met and circulated Central Document No.18 of 2008, which 
laid out ten steps that the government and party would be taking to avert the crisis, 
including details about the implementation of the stimulus and the implementation of 
expansionary monetary policies.169 
The effects of the Chinese government’s decisive action seem to vindicate its 
response. Employment stopped declining and output began to grow once again by mid-
year 2009.170 Indeed, during years in which nearly every other country’s GDP growth rate 
was tumbling, the PRC’s GDP growth rate retained its incredible heights. In 2008, the year 
in which the crisis hit, the PRC managed to maintain a 9.6 percent GDP growth rate. In 
2009, the first full year of crisis, the PRC’s GDP growth fell slightly to 9.4 percent but 
rebounded to 10.6 percent in 2010.171 By contrast, the U.S. GDP growth rate during those 
same years was -.3 percent, -2.8 percent, and 2.5 percent respectively. A casual observer 
would easily believe that the Chinese response to the GFC was an astounding success.  
However, when put in the context of the political and economic reforms that Hu 
Jintao and the Chinese leadership were attempting to implement, the Chinese response 
could not have been a greater setback for the reform agenda. In the first place, seeing 
declining rates of return on massive investments in capital in the years leading up to the 
GFC, the government had been attempting to shift the development model away from 
investment and exports and toward domestic consumption to put the country on a more 
stable growth path. To this end, the PRC had initiated painful reforms to reign in the 
massive amounts of investment coming from the banking system. Budget constraints were 
hardened, management systems were restructured, the banks themselves were 
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recapitalized, and billions of RMB worth of non-performing loans were written off.172 But 
the PRC’s response to the GFC—namely the massive stimulus, low interest rates, and low 
reserve requirements—sent signals to banks that these reforms were being cast aside to 
save the national economy. Believing that they would no longer be held to the high 
standards, bank managers at both the national and local level initiated a no-holds-barred 
lending spree, resulting in an increase in the share of investment in the economy, exactly 
the opposite of what Hu and his comrades had been attempting to do.  
In addition to the bank reforms, government and party leaders had been attempting 
to enact crucial reforms in order to put to the PRC on track toward a more efficient, market-
based economy. However, during the GFC, these reforms were also put on hold. As 
Naughton states, “the GFC response was to strengthen the state sector, legitimize increased 
government steerage of the economy, and bring the financial sector back under government 
tutelage as an instrument of government policy.” 173 Instead of engendering crucial reforms 
in the political economic system, the GFC reversed them. Instead of market reforms, the 
state took on a larger role in economy, again the exact opposite of what the Hu had been 
trying to do to up to that time. Ultimately, the Chinese response to the GFC, while likely 
necessary to prevent the collapse of the Chinese economy (and ergo the CCP itself), 
undoubtedly prevented any chance of further economic reform while Hu Jintao was in 
office. Whether this would have been true of any other leader is uncertain, but the extent 
of the incentives created by the response and the setback the response dealt to the 
government seems to suggest that Hu’s failure to effectively implement reform in the wake 
of the GFC was out of his control. 
The problem for Hu is that Chinese elite may not have necessarily perceived that 
to have been the case. In fact, it seems that Chinese leaders may have perceived the exact 
opposite, believing that the Chinese response to the GFC was an astounding success and a 
vindication of the Chinese political-economic model. Mentions of this “China Model” in 
official Chinese media peaked in 2008 and 2009, painting the Chinese system, which had 
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produced the economic recovery, in a favorable light when compared to the Western 
system and its sluggish recovery.174 Further evidence of this triumphal spirit is seen in the 
government work report presented at the NPC in March of 2010 by Premier Wen Jiabao. 
While Wen certainly acknowledges the GFC and the Chinese recovery have resulted in a 
series of economic challenges, he also praises “the socialist system’s advantages, which 
enable us to make decisions efficiently, organize effectively, and concentrate resources to 
accomplish large undertakings.” 175 Ultimately, while this may not be the opinion of Wen 
as an individual, the government work report certainly reflects the conclusion of CCP 
leadership as a whole.176 And if the CCP viewed the response to GFC in such a favorable 
light, they inevitably found another scapegoat to explain the failure of economic reforms.  
E. A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP: HU JINTAO AND THE SYSTEM OF 
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
Having praised the response of the Chinese government to the GFC and the system 
that they perceived to have facilitated that response, Chinese leaders could not immediately 
turn their back on such statements in the face of slowing economic reforms after the GFC. 
Instead, blame for this slowdown fell to the man who headed the government and the 
party—Hu Jintao. Hu was an easy target for criticism, possessing many personal and 
professional qualities that made him seem indecisive and overly cautious. And because the 
system of collective leadership became so closely associated with Hu, having been nearly 
consolidate under his term, criticism of Hu turned into criticism of the system as a whole, 
eventually paving the way for the consolidation of power in the hands of Hu’s successor 
Xi Jinping. 
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1. Hu’s the Problem 
In order to explain why reform stalled post-GFC, Chinese leaders immediately 
turned to Hu’s personal qualities and the system of collective leadership. From the 
beginning, it was obvious to many observers that Hu Jintao did not possess the charisma 
or presence of his predecessors, a problem that did not become obvious until it became a 
liability in his drive to implement his reform agenda. In his entire time in office, Hu made 
only a single, on-the-record joke (concerning the practice of elderly Chinese leaders to dye 
their hair), exemplifying Hu’s extreme dullness and the fact that, as some officials have 
privately admitted, “their leader doesn’t do emotion.” 177 In fact, things got so bad under 
Hu, who frequently spoke in the sterile, hollow language of Chinese leaders, that the CCP 
supposedly began issuing directives to make meetings more engaging and eliminate 
“empty and rigmarole talks.” 178 More damaging in the eyes of his critics than the simple 
fact that many consider Hu to be dull and boring is the fact that Hu is often publicly quiet, 
noncommittal, or even absent altogether when crises occur. When it came to the personnel 
controversies surrounding Wang Lijun, Bo Xilai, or Chen Liangyu or the 2008 and 2009 
uprisings in Tibet and Xinjiang respectively, Hu delegated the response to the propaganda 
organs of the CCP and emphasized the institutional role in resolving the matters as opposed 
to his own personal role.179 
Hu’s propensity to emphasize the party routine over his personal political influence 
can likely be attributed, at least partially, to his political pedigree. Hu rose to power as a 
member of the CCYL, an organization meant to develop communist leaders from all 
backgrounds, and he therefore had to work through the CCP’s winding bureaucracies 
before assuming his leadership position. As such, Hu and fellow CCYL alumni like him 
generally have few connections the elite of Chinese society and little background in finance 
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or economics.180 Instead, most alumni of the CCYL developed most of their political 
experience while working in the areas of party propaganda and party organization.181 As a 
result, Hu has become a true party technocrat, an individual skilled in managing large 
bureaucracies and formulating policies but lacking the political gravitas or will to push 
through difficult but necessary political-economic reforms. Simply looking at the names, 
he chose for his signature policy initiatives—“scientific development concept” and 
“socialist harmonious society”—demonstrates this point.182 Ultimately, Hu’s experience in 
the party bureaucracy likely preconditioned him to be the “technocratic caretaker” of the 
status quo, an individual able to effectively maintain the status quo within the country but 
unable to bring his skills to bear on the tough problem of reform.183 
2. Guilty by Association 
With Hu being personally criticized for his failure to push through reform, that CCP 
soon set its sights on the system of collective leadership that had become closely associated 
with Hu during his time in office. Initial criticism, however, was not aimed directly at the 
system of collective leadership, but on the need for reform in general, and such criticism 
over advocated for further democratic reforms, not power consolidation. One of the earliest 
voices for further reform was, paradoxically, Premier Wen Jiabao, who, as early as 2010, 
had been calling for substantial political and economic reform. In just over a forty-day 
period in August and September of 2010, Wen discussed political reform seven distinct 
times in several different contexts.184 He continued to do so regularly and frequently for 
the next several years, the lone voice calling for “adhering to the governing of the nation 
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by rule of law” and “the democratic rights of the people.” 185 In late 2011, Wen was joined 
by then-Communist Party Secretary of Guangdong province Wang Yang who, responding 
to violence and unrest within his province in late 2011, professed the need to mount 
aggressive political and economic reform to fix inequities within those systems.186 Wang’s 
call was only strengthened when Premier Wen Jiabao appeared in Guangdong in January 
of 2012 to commemorate Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, significant because Wen echoed 
Wang’s calls but more importantly because such calls happened fit perfectly with the object 
of the commemoration, Deng’s trip to the Southern provinces in an attempt to revitalize 
economic reform.187 During a press conference in March, Wen referenced the elections in 
the village of Wukan that had ended the unrest in Guangdong as an example of the success 
of political reforms: “If people can run a village well…they can manage a country.” 188 
Clearly, talk of reform to the political system was well underway by spring of 2012, mere 
months before the Eighteenth Party Congress.  
That same spring, the conservative backlash began. Various editorials in prominent 
newspapers within the PRC began equating reform to “assaulting fortified positions.”189 
That phrase, until the spring of 2012, had not been frequently used, suggesting its consistent 
appearance in the spring of 2012 was meant to highlight the urgent need for reform in the 
run up to the Eighteenth Party Congress.190 Such widespread commentary on the need for 
political reform to facilitate economic reform caught the attention of the party. The 
following summer, the Central Party School in its journal Red Flag began calling for 
reform, but, significantly, this commentary stressed the need for the CCP to maintain its 
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power while implementing such reform.191 The rule of the CCP, one author wrote, “suits 
China’s national conditions and is in accord with the fundamental interests of the people.” 
192 Clearly, the party recognized the necessity of some political change to facilitate reform 
in other areas but knew that the democratic changes advocated by some would threaten the 
CCP’s rule.  
Most of the criticism of the collective leadership system itself began to circulate in 
the lead up to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, a sign that the CCP was preparing to 
make important changes at this crucial political juncture. By August of that year, the CCP 
seemed to have formulated their answer to the debate over political reform taking place 
within the party. An official party journal, Seeking Truth, took aim at the system of 
collective leadership directly, claiming that the system had led rampant corruption and 
ineffective policymaking resulting from the diffusion of political power.193 Having the 
answer to their political reform problem in hand, the Chinese leadership then moved to 
make it official in the Eighteenth Party Congress in November of 2012. 
The Eighteenth Party Congress ended what debate there was over the direction of 
political reform and opened the door for Xi Jinping to begin his process of power 
consolidation. In the most obvious structural reform resulting from the congress, the PSC 
was reduced from nine to seven members, shrinking to most powerful decision-making 
body in the PRC in order to more easily achieve consensus in the future.194 To be fair, the 
move puts current size of the PSC more in line with the past, but it certainly consolidates 
power within the hands of the remaining members.195 More significant, though, was the 
content of the Eighteenth Party Congress work report as presented by Hu as one of his last 
duties as general secretary of the CCP. The report made no mention of collective 
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leadership, the watchword of the past few decades, indeed the very system so many had 
been working to institutionalize over the years.196 Instead, Hu stated that “the Party should 
improve the mechanism for coordinating structural reforms and conduct major reforms in 
a holistic way according to the overall plan,” clearly suggesting that power needed to be 
brought back to the center.197 He continued by suggesting that such political reform must 
precede reform in any other area, a clear indication that his successor would need to 
centralize power in order to successfully pursue other reforms.198 All in all, Hu’s speech 
seemed to be a major setback for those who supported the collective leadership system and 
a boon for those who wanted to see centralized political control. 
F. CONCLUSION: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED?  
Overall, it seems Xi’s centralization of power beginning with his ascendance to the 
top offices of the CCP and PRC at the Eighteenth Party Congress was encouraged by 
members within the CCP who had grown frustrated with economic reform stagnation under 
Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. Hu’s economic reforms were greatly impeded by the GFC and 
the Chinese response to it, but Chinese leaders chose to see such reform stagnation as the 
result of weak leadership on Hu’s part. As a result, Hu has been frequently cast as an 
ineffective, boring, quiet, emotionless, and technocratic leader incapable of pushing 
through tough economic reforms. CCP frustration with Hu eventually expanded to include 
frustration with the system of collective leadership itself, leading to calls from many within 
the CCP to embark on political reform. Ultimately, such calls provided the backdrop to the 
Eighteenth Party Congress at which it seems Xi was given carte blanche to reform the 
Chinese political system by pursuing policies of power centralization.   
However, to place the blame for the failure to reform at the feet of Hu and the 
system of collective leadership is not entirely fair. In the first place, the GFC and the PRC’s 
response to it certainly affected, if not completely reversed, the reforms Hu was trying to 
implement. Although Hu certainly had a large hand in implementing the Chinese response 
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to the GFC, he did not seem to have much of a choice, especially if his primary concern 
was the continuation of CCP rule in the PRC. Even so, Hu’s reforms did demonstrate some 
promise, specifically in the area of income inequality. In 2004, rural consumption began to 
catch-up with urban consumption, and, relatedly, by 2011 half of all Chinese provinces 
achieved urban wages within ten percent of the national average.199 But this limited success 
was not enough to outweigh another set of factors that likely limited reform post-GFC—
an incredibly entrenched web of special interests reinforced by structural impediments to 
reform. 
While Hu’s reform goals as exemplified in the scientific development concept and 
the socialist harmonious society were noble, Hu was unable to implement them in the face 
of staunch resistance from sectors that would have ultimately lost as a result of the reform 
Hu was advocating. Most of these problems came on the economic front. While Hu made 
some progress on economic inequality issues, even this progress was not enough to stop 
the growth of inequality within the PRC, as the structural challenges of an industrializing 
economy managed by corrupt local governments allowed the Gini coefficient to rise 
unabated throughout Hu’s time in office.200 With respect to the development of a holistic 
approach to growth, institutions governing the conduct of party cadre proved difficult to 
reform. Although party cadre were instructed to focus on a broad definition of development 
to include environmental sustainability, economic growth, seated at the top in terms of 
priorities, proved hard to unseat.201 As such, environmental and social problems continued 
apace. However, the single biggest problem facing Hu and other Chinese leaders was the 
underlying network of corruption within the PRC. Stretching up to the highest levels of the 
government and the party, it was estimated that corruption cost the Chinese economy $84.4 
billion or five percent of the PRC’s GDP that year.202 Such a profitable system undoubtedly 
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produced staunch defenders. Up to the beginning of Hu’s tenure, Chinese leaders had not 
had to face these problems directly, as the piecemeal transition from a centrally-planned 
economy to a market economy facilitated gradual changes. Yet, despite the genius of such 
a system, the Chinese leadership was inevitably going to have to face these tough obstacles, 
and that job ultimately fell to Hu. 
Whether or not the failure to implement economic reforms under Hu Jintao was the 
result of his own political shortcomings, those of system which he oversaw, or the GFC 
over which he had no control, the result remains the same—failure to enact meaningful 
reforms across many different areas led Chinese leaders to lose faith in the system of 
collective leadership and institutional politics and shift to a system of centralized leadership 
and personal politics. As such, the door opened for Xi to begin a reversal of the trend 
toward institutional politics that had dominated the Chinese political sphere since the 
1970s. Elected general secretary of the CCP at the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 
2012 and president at the NPC the following March, Xi began to aggressively pursue his 
vision of top-down policymaking. In fact, the pace and aggressiveness of Xi’s reform 
indicate a zeal not matched by his two immediate predecessors, a factor that can be partially 
attributed to the favorable make-up of the Politburo, as many of Xi’s allies were able to 
take over the vacated positions, and the PSC, as the reduced membership facilitated 
consensus decision making.203 In addition to early reform across the policy spectrum, Xi 
also developed and implemented a complex systems theory and mandated party cadre learn 
the theory which, not coincidentally, called for a strong central leader to oversee the 
system.204  
Ironically, all this is happening at the expense of the system set up by Deng 
Xiaoping and consolidated until 2012, a system that was meant to better facilitate necessary 
reforms in the PRC. Indeed, the Chinese leadership seems to have bet that a system of more 
centralized control will lead to a better outcome than a system of collective leadership, a 
reversal of the attitude that pervaded the party at the start of the reform era in the 1970s. 
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They are not without their reasons. While collective leadership had facilitated many of the 
economic reforms in the latter half of the twentieth century, the perception among Chinese 
leaders was that the system had failed at a crucial juncture in the twenty-first. However, 
such a perception vastly underestimates the extent to which reform in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century was stalled by the strength of vested interests and the dramatic 
impact of the GFC. In short, Chinese leaders made a bad bet, betting against a system that 
they wrongly equated with failure, against a system that would have likely done more to 
help facilitate reform than to hinder it in the coming decade. 
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IV. XI’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN: GENUINE REFORM 
OR POLITICAL TOOL? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When he took the helm of the PRC and the CCP, Xi Jinping immediately began a 
sweeping anti-corruption campaign across the whole of the country. As a result, hundreds 
of thousands of officials have been arrested and prosecuted for crimes relating to corruption 
since the campaign first began in 2013. It is no coincidence that the campaign aligns with 
Xi’s ascension to positions of power. Personally, Xi has a history and reputation as a leader 
unafraid to take on corruption in Chinese society, supporting anti-corruption campaigns in 
the various localities he presided over before taking the top job. Within the context of his 
position, Xi seems to have simply carried on leadership’s tradition of beginning anti-
corruption campaigns to tackle this endemic and long-lasting problem within the PRC.  
Yet, to many, this particular assault seems different for two distinct reasons. 205 
First, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign seems to be an expansion of the depth and focus of 
anti-corruption campaigns in the Reform Era. Far from rooting out corruption along the 
periphery and at lower levels of government, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has targeted 
what are referred to as “tigers”—individuals with high positions in the CCP and PRC—as 
well as “flies”—the smaller, corrupt players in the political-economic system. 206 This line 
of thinking can be reduced to the following question: is Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
different from previous anti-corruption campaigns? Another argument suggests that Xi’s 
anti-corruption campaign, as opposed to past campaigns, is politically motivated, primarily 
used to target Xi’s political enemies instead of rooting out corruption on the whole. Indeed, 
Xi’s assault on corruption has seen the downfall of many prominent Chinese officials, some 
of whom were believed to be Xi’s political foes. This view can also be summarized with 
the following question: Is Xi’s anti-corruption campaigned being used to target his political 
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opponents? For those who would answer both these questions in the affirmative, another 
important question arises—is Xi using the anti-corruption campaign as a way to punish 
those who have challenged his centralization of power and cow those who may? Just as it 
is no coincidence that Xi is embarking on an anti-corruption campaign from both a personal 
and positional perspective, it may also be no coincidence that he is embarking on such a 
campaign while pushing through political reforms. 
This chapter will seek to answer these questions, weighing evidence both for and 
against the first assertion—Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is unique in scope—and the 
second assertion—that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is being used to target his political 
enemies—in order to come to a conclusion on if Xi is using the campaign to further his 
political program. Ultimately, the evidence suggest that both the initial assertions are true. 
Xi’s campaign is unique because of the focus Xi, the party, and the government have placed 
on it in recent years and Xi’s campaign is almost definitely being used to target his political 
opponents. However, crucially, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is not unique because it is 
being used to target political opponents. On the contrary, there is a large history of anti-
corruption campaigns being initiated by Chinese leaders to bring about the downfall of 
their political opponents. The difference is the legacy of politically motivated anti-
corruption campaigns is now being coupled with an anti-corruption campaign of a scope, 
depth, and seriousness that has heretofore not been seen in Chinese politics. Clearly, Xi 
has begun a new type of campaign in China, an unprecedentedly massive and focused 
assault on corruption that simultaneously seeks to cleanse Chinese politics of this pervasive 
problem and purge the CCP and the PRC of Xi’s political opponents so that he can continue 
to centralize power in his own hands. This surprisingly is not inconsistent with the idea that 
the CCP backed Xi’s centralization of power. Many of the networks Xi has targeted have 
been completely detached from his own political networks, suggesting that while those 
who have been targeted may not have objected to the centralization of power as a concept, 
they objected to the centralization of power under Xi.  
To truly understand why the anti-corruption campaign in PRC is a mechanism for 
Xi to centralize political power, both of the above assertions much be tested against the 
evidence. First, in order to ascertain if Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is any different from 
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those of his predecessors, his anti-corruption campaign must be put into the proper 
historical context by comparing it with previous anti-corruption campaigns during the 
Reform Period. Such a comparison will inevitably involve the length, the scope, the depth, 
and the methods of the anti-corruption campaign. Second, in order to ascertain if Xi’s 
assault on corruption is actually being used to target his political opponents, the results of 
the campaign and the motivations for beginning it must be scrutinized. With respect to the 
former, it will be useful to examine if Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is targeting officials 
based on factional, geographical, or policy lines; some combination thereof; or in no 
distinguishable pattern at all. With respect to the latter, Xi’s personal experience with anti-
corruption and the motivation behind other, previous anti-corruption campaigns must be 
addressed. Finally, to conclude, the efficacy of such an anti-corruption campaign will be 
examined, leading to a broader question of if Xi’s campaign can ultimately be successful 
in reducing the amount of corruption within Chinese politics. Ultimately, such an 
achievement is doubtful, as Xi, for political reasons, seems content with targeting the 
symptoms of the corruption problem—the corruption officials themselves—rather than the 
source of the problem itself. 
B. CORRUPTION IN CONTEXT 
Anti-corruption campaigns have long been a feature of Chinese politics if only 
because corruption itself has long pervaded the Chinese political system. During the Ming 
and Qing dynasties, imperial officials were incentivized to engage in corrupt practices by 
their low salaries and limited oversight, with some Qing officials adding as much as fifty 
percent to the official tax quota in order to enrich themselves.207 The ensuing Republican 
Era also saw rampant corruption, especially under Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT government. 
In fact, corruption was one of the primary reasons for the CCP’s victory over Chiang and 
the KMT, as the local population despised a KMT regime that they viewed as primarily 
extractive and embraced a CCP that had earned a reputation for redistributing goods and 
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foodstuffs.208 Therefore, when Mao and the CCP drove the KMT to Taiwan and took over 
China, they recognized the necessity of tackling corruption, especially after inheriting the 
bureaucracy of the KMT, in order to legitimize the CCP regime in the eyes of the Chinese 
people.209 Therefore, between 1949 and 1951, the CCP targeted roughly six-hundred and 
fifty people in their efforts to battle corruption, marking the first anti-corruption project in 
the PRC.210 Ultimately, corruption under Mao remained a problem, but not a systemic one. 
Once the reform periods began, however, corruption ascended to an entirely new level. 
While the massive economic reforms that began during the mid-1970s under Deng 
Xiaoping certainly brought substantial economic opportunity to the PRC, they also brought 
substantial opportunity for actors within this new political-economic system to engage in 
corruption. To some extent, the policies meant to move the PRC toward a market economy 
facilitated the growth of corruption. For example, the dual-track pricing system initiated 
early in the reform era easily allowed officials buy goods for one price and sell them for a 
profit at another. Such corruption was tacitly permitted as a way to compensate and 
reassure officials who jobs were threatened by the new market economy. Additionally, 
allowing officials to take their share of their region’s economic growth was seen as a way 
to incentivize economic growth in the region, the thinking being that officials would focus 
on growing their localities economy if they too could share in that growth.211 But as time 
has passed, Chinese leaders came to realize that corruption had increasingly become a 
genuine threat to the further pursuit of market-orientated reform. This is evident in the 
growth of corruption as a share of the Chinese economy. By some measurements, the 
average amount of yuan involved in a corruption case had had grown from 100,000 in the 
late 1970s to over several million by the late 1990s.212 With several hundred thousand 
                                                 
208 Quah, “Hunting the Corrupt ‘Tigers’ and ‘Flies’ in China: An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015),” 9-11. 
209 Quah, 9-12. 
210 Xiaobo Lü, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist 
Party (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
211 Kroeber, China’s Economy, 206-207. 
212 Quah, “Hunting the Corrupt ‘Tigers’ and ‘Flies’ in China: An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015),” 11-12. 
69 
corrupt officials operating throughout the country, losses due to corruption amounted to 
roughly 13.2% to 16.8% of the PRC’s total GDP by the late 1990s.213  
As a result of this widespread corruption during the Reform Era, Chinese leaders 
began to see anti-corruption campaigns as a vehicle for them to address serious systemic 
problems while strengthening the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people. 
Starting in 1982, Chinese leaders began anti-corruption campaigns about every two 
years.214 Ostensibly, these movements were meant to combat corruption within the Chinese 
political system. In reality, they served broader purposes, specifically to reinforce the status 
of the CCP as the country’s legitimate ruling party, and were therefore curtailed in their 
ability to actually root out corruption within the Chinese political system. This was 
primarily due to the thin line Chinese leaders walked in their anti-corruption campaigns. 
On the one hand, if the CCP was viewed as too lenient on corruption, it could lose 
credibility in the eyes of the Chinese people. On the other hand, if the CCP came down too 
hard on corruption, it could simultaneously weaken the political system by causing 
defections from the party and lead to an impression among the populous, by virtue of the 
sheer number of cases a no-holds-barred anti-corruption campaign would bring, that the 
regime was hopelessly corrupt.215 Therefore, Chinese anti-corruption campaigns 
developed into a routinized system in which the anti-corruption campaigns targeted a 
specific number of particularly egregious cases but failed to actually solve the problem. 
Between 1980 and 2000, Chinese officials investigated an average of 35,000 cases per 
year.216 During the mid-2000s, that number jumped up to about 100,000 cases per year.217 
                                                 
213 Zheng Chang, “Understanding the Corruption Networks Revealed in the Current Chinese Anti-
Corruption Campaign: A Social Network Approach,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 113 
(September 3, 2018): 735–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1458060. 
214 Macabe Keliher and Hsinchao Wu, “Corruption, Anticorruption, and the Transformation of Political 
Culture in Contemporary China,” The Journal of Asian Studies 75, no. 1 (February 2016): 5–18, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S002191181500203X. 
215 Fu Hualing, “Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption Campaign,” SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, September 6, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2492407. 
216 Quah, “Hunting the Corrupt ‘Tigers’ and ‘Flies’ in China: An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015)” 215. 
217 Keliher and Wu, “Corruption, Anticorruption, and the Transformation of Political Culture in 
Contemporary China,” 5-18.  
70 
It was not until Xi Jinping came to power during in 2012 that the routinized process of anti-
corruption campaigns was actually replaced with a vigorous effort to actually stem 
corruption. 
C. WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE: XI’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN 
On the surface, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign can be viewed as just another 
iteration of the endless cycle of anti-corruption campaigns that have plagued Chinese 
politics since the start of the reform era. However, there are several factors that demonstrate 
that Xi’s campaign is different from those that have come before it. Perhaps the most 
obvious one is the sheer amount of time that Xi’s campaign has lasted. Rather than fading 
away after a year or two like previous campaigns, Xi’s assault on corruption has had a 
unique staying power likely due to Xi’s intense focus on the issue. From his inauguration 
in November 2012 as General Secretary of the Communist Party, when he signaled the 
start of the campaign by specifically mentioning corruption as part of the “many pressing 
problems within the Party that need to be resolved” (he did not specify any other problems), 
until the present day, Xi has unceasingly worked to make his anti-corruption campaign a 
hallmark of his time in office.218 In addition to the amount of time Xi has spent on his anti-
corruption campaign, four other factors distinguish his campaign from past ones: the size, 
the spread, the targets, and the methods.  
In the first place, the sheer number of people being targeted in Xi’s campaign 
certainly distinguishes it from many campaigns that have come before it. The anti-
corruption efforts immediately preceding Xi’s netted roughly 100,000 people per year 
between 2002 and 2007, for a total 518, 484 cadre who faced disciplinary action. Between 
2013, Xi’s first year in power, and the middle of 2018, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
netted some two million individuals and only seems to be accelerating.219 The campaign 
netted 172,000 people in 2013, 330,000 people in 2014, 527,000 people in 2017, and 
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302,000 people in the first half of 2018 alone.220 Clearly, the sheer numbers of Xi’s effort 
distinguish the campaign from those that have come before it. 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is also distinguished from past campaigns by the 
people the campaign has targeted. Xi has famously claimed that his campaign will target 
both tiger and flies, unlike past campaigns which avoided targeting high-ranking officials. 
Xi has been true to his word. The number of officials at the deputy-ministerial rank or 
above who were disciplined as a result of the anti-corruption campaign increased more than 
fourfold during the term of the Eighteen Party Congress (2013-2017) when compared to 
the average number of officials of similar rank disciplined during the previous four party 
congresses.221 Looking at the highest echelons of political power in the CCP, twenty-one 
Central Committee members (both former and current) were disciplined for corruption, 
two-times more than the ten Central Committee members disciplined during the previous 
four Party Congresses combined.222 Nor has Xi’s campaign been confined to civilian party 
members. Unlike previous, anti-corruption campaigns, Xi has also targeted high-ranking 
brass in the PLA, targeting two former deputy chairmen of the CMC and two more 
members of the CMC who were serving on the body when they were removed.223  
The expansion of the scope of anti-corruption efforts under Xi in and of itself 
distinguishes it from previous campaigns which had adhered to an unwritten rule 
concerning who could be targeted. Up until Xi, anti-corruption efforts generally adhered 
to the rule that PSC members, serving or retired, were exempt from prosecution. 
Additionally, the rule extended to immediate families of these PSC members.224 However, 
in 2014, one of the members of the cohort of Central Committee member during disciplined 
during Eighteenth Party Congress was Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the PSC, 
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marking the first time a member of the highest-ranking body in the CCP was disciplined 
as part of anti-corruption drive.225 By targeting Zhou Yongkang, Xi undid this unwritten 
agreement. To do so, he had to overcome the reservations of many party elders, including 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, meaning that Xi had acquired enough power within the party 
to override a rule that would put the highest-ranking members of the CCP at risk.226 
Finally, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is different because it not only aims to 
sanction those who have engaged in corrupt activities, but it also aims to change the culture 
and behavior of CCP officials. To that end, Xi issued an eight-point regulation detailing 
new rules aimed to curtail the benefits that many CCP officials had enjoyed as a result of 
their political positions.227 These regulations specifically targeted official banquets, foreign 
travel, and official cars, aspects of Chinese officialdom that have been used to signal one’s 
status and power within the political system.228 Although not strictly indicative of corrupt 
behavior, such actions are easily construed as such in the public eye. This fact almost 
certainly prompted the new regulations, as a large goal of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, 
like those of the past, is to shore up public support for the CCP. According to some, Xi’s 
efforts to reform the culture of officialdom seem to be what distinguishes his anti-
corruption campaign from previous anti-corruption struggles.229 Regardless of how one 
defines it, Xi’s decision to reform corrupt behavior and his decision to expand the size and 
scope of his anti-corruption campaign certainly suggest something new is afoot in the PRC.  
D. WHY THE DIFFERENCE: THE MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS OF XI’S 
ASSAULT ON CORRUPTION 
Having established that Xi’s assault on corruption is different in length, scope, and 
content when compared to other anti-corruption efforts in the Reform Era, I will now turn 
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to the question of if the motivations for this particular campaign are any different from 
those of the past. To answer this question, I turn to two separate factors—Xi’s history as a 
CCP official and the historical pattern of previous anti-corruption campaigns. Xi’s history 
as a cadre is defined by notable anti-corruption activities in the localities over which he 
governed prior to taking the CCP’s top job, suggesting the current assault is indeed a 
genuine attempt to root out corruption in the CCP. Yet, when the campaign itself is put into 
context with other Reform Era anti-corruption corruption efforts, it becomes obvious that 
this is not Xi’s real intent. The fact of the matter is that all significant anti-corruption efforts 
in the PRC have had a political motivation and there is no reason to think Xi’s is any 
different. The evidence testifies to this fact; Xi’s campaign seems to follow clear patterns, 
targeting networks of cadre who have worked together in the past and formed power bases 
outside Xi’s own. Ultimately, it seems that Xi has leveraged his reputation as a graft buster 
and incorruptible official to begin a sweeping takedown of his political enemies in the guise 
of an anti-corruption campaign. 
1. A Sterling Reputation: Xi’s Personal Commitment to Anti-corruption 
Like most CCP leaders today, Xi worked his way up the organizational ladder, 
developing a strong reputation for a graft buster along the way. This reputation mainly 
developed after Xi’s stint as Party Secretary in the Ningde District of Fujian Province. In 
1988, at age thirty-five, Xi was sent to Ningde, a poverty-stricken district with a population 
of about three million and a per capita income of about one-hundred and sixty renminbi.230 
Upon arriving in Ningde, he found that more than 7,300 cadre had built small villas 
(constructing a house is a significant life achievement in this area) on farmland 
appropriated from the district’s residents.231 Additionally, the cost of the villas was well 
over the salaries of the cadre in the district. One villa was estimated to have cost 
RMB100,000, an exorbitant sum for an official serving in such an impoverish district, 
suggesting that this villa, and many like it, had been constructed with ill-gotten gains.232 
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While the local party committee had investigated the problem on three separate occasions, 
it was not until Xi arrived that anything was actually done about it. Xi immediately went 
to work to crackdown on the corrupt cadre in Ningde by demolishing the villas themselves 
and placing their owners under investigation.233 When the locals responded positively to 
Xi’s initiatives, the press began to take notice. Zhang Mingqing, the provincial head of the 
People’s Daily, published an article about Xi’s efforts entitled “Wining the Hearts of Ten 
Thousand People Through Doing a Good Deed,” which was circulated across the country, 
giving Xi a national reputation as a graft buster.234  
Xi’s reputation not only as a graft buster but also as a clean official was further 
reinforced by his subsequent positions Deputy-Party Secretary of Fujian and as Party 
Secretary of Shanghai. In his position as the former from 1995 to 2002, Xi involved with 
the corruption investigation into Lai Changxing, a businessman from the city of Xiamen, 
who reported made fifty million RMB through corrupt activities.235 Xi, using his sterling 
reputation, was able to bring back a sense normalcy after the investigation results in the 
takedown of Lai’s network, which included government and party officials, and in the 
resignation of the Fujian Party Secretary.236 Years later, in March of 2007, Xi performed a 
similar feat in Shanghai in the aftermath of the sacking of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen 
Liangyu. Chen, along with his political network, was brought down in a massive corruption 
probe that involved many of the city’s officials and several million RMB.237 Moving into 
the city to replace his disgraced predecessors, Xi was tasked with cleaning up the city and 
rebuilding the legitimacy of the party.238 To do so, Xi reportedly instituted new rules in 
Shanghai that required CCP cadre within the city to report their assets in an effort to 
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increase financial transparency.239 Clearly, Xi reputation as an incorruptible politician who 
is tough on corruption was only furthered by his assignments in Fujian and Shanghai and 
it seems to be the case that his reputation was at least a factor in him ability to obtain those 
positions in the first place. 
Although Xi has been painted as a tough, incorruptible figure, that may simply be 
the image he has worked hard to cultivate. In actuality, the truth may be a bit more 
complicated. Contrary to his image as an honest official, Xi’s extended family has grown 
wealthy as Xi has risen in the ranks of CCP, coming into millions of dollars’ worth of 
financial assets over the course of Xi’s career.240 While none of the assets have been traced 
direct to Xi or his immediate family, the ability of Xi’s family (or the family of any CCP 
officials for that matter) to grow wealthy while their relatives rise in rank and power 
certainly raises questions of how clean incorruptible officials actually are. The timing of 
Xi’s various positions also raises questions concerning what he knew and when he knew 
it. Although Xi worked hard to clean up after the Lai Changxing scandal, his long history 
in Fujian suggests that he likely knew what had been going on for quite some time.241 Nor 
was the Lai Changxing the only corruption scandal that took place in Fujian while Xi was 
there. The series of corruption scandals that occurred in Fujian during his seventeen-year 
tenure there may not implicate Xi, but they certainly call into question his pristine image 
of an official ready and willing to tackle corruption wherever he sees it.242 
All that being said, there may be at least some truth to Xi’s personal commitment 
to corruption outside of his history and image as a graft buster. Significantly, Xi has 
continued the anti-corruption campaign even in the face of evidence that the campaign may 
be doing more harm than good to the image of the CCP. There has always been a worry 
that exposing and tackling corruption within the country could actually turn the populous 
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against the CCP, as highlighting the successes of an anti-corruption campaign also 
paradoxically highlights just how much corruption actually exists in the country. It seems, 
at least to some extent, that is what is actually happening. One recent survey suggests that 
the number of corruption cases in a province is inversely correlated with the perception of 
the level of corruption in the central government.243 In other words, many Chinese have 
begun to blame the central government for the problem of corruption within their own 
localities. Despite the danger that this poses to the CCP, Xi has persevered in his campaign 
against corruption within the country, suggesting that his commitment truly lies in rooting 
out corruption within the country.  
2. It’s Always Political: The Political Legacy of Anti-corruption 
While there may be substantial evidence in Xi’s past and current conduct that 
suggests his main motivation for beginning this new, sweeping anti-corruption campaign 
is to actually root out corruption, the historical legacies of anti-corruption campaigns in 
China tell a different story. While anti-corruption campaigns have always been a hallmark 
of the Chinese political sphere, so has, it would seem, the tendency to use these campaigns 
to undermine political opponents by directly implicating them in corruption scandals or 
implicating the opponent’s political allies.244 The fact is that most (if not all) officials in 
the CCP have at one point or another been involved in corrupt dealings. Therefore, 
whenever charges of corruption come up, they are likely to stick, making anti-corruption 
efforts a potent political weapon for any Chinese leaders who feels the need to consolidate 
power. This is exactly what happened in two previous anti-corruption struggles, one by 
Jiang Zemin and another by Hu Jintao. 
a. Chen Xitong 
In 1993, Jiang Zemin began an anti-corruption campaign ostensibly to respond to 
reports that corruption was spreading at an alarming rate in the wake of the reboot of 
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economic reforms.245 Like all anti-corruption campaigns in the PRC, the campaign initially 
only targeted the “flies” but, as the campaign dragged on and the operation began to bag 
“tigers,” it became clear that the motivations behind this campaign were not purely to clean 
up the political system. To put the moment into context, the anti-corruption campaign was 
begun in the midst of a concerted effort by Jiang Zemin to solidify his power within the 
CCP. In 1994, the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress had just bestowed the 
title of “core” leader on Jiang.246 While he was solidifying his position, he still had to 
overcome other nodes of power within the CCP. Therefore, it is not surprising that, by the 
beginning of 1995, the anti-corruption campaign had set its sights on high-ranking Chen 
Xitong, the Beijing Party Secretary, and the cadre who surrounded him, individuals who, 
by virtue of their support from party elders like Deng Xiaoping, represented a threat to 
Jiang’s authority.247 
Like all operations to take down “tigers” in the Chinese political system, anti-
corruption officials targeted the individuals surrounding Chen first. In February and March 
of 1995, anti-corruption officials rounded up roughly sixty CCP cadre based in Beijing, 
including the secretaries of both Chen the Beijing’s Mayor Li Qiyan.248 In April, after the 
suicide of Beijing’s Vice-Mayor Wang Baosen gave Jiang the pretext to intensify the 
campaign, Chen himself was placed under investigation. Chen was simultaneously 
removed from his position as Beijing Party Secretary and, in September of 1995, he was 
officially removed from the Politburo.249 Ultimately, Chen was sentenced to sixteen years 
in prison for accepting RMB550, 000 in bribes and for using public funds to build luxury 
villas, becoming the highest-ranking official to be brought down on corruption charges up 
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to that point in Chinese political history.250 Until his death, Chen maintained that corruption 
charges brought against him were manufactured and that he was ultimately the victim of a 
power CCP power struggle.251  
b. Chen Liangyu 
Despite the fact that there were certainly other corrupt cadre who equaled Chen’s 
rank in the CCP, another “tiger” of his rank was not brought down until Hu Jintao targeted 
Chen Liangyu in 2006.252 Like Jiang campaign before him, Hu brought down Chen by 
targeting those around him before finally moving on Chen himself. Six other senior 
officials in Shanghai were targeted before authorities focused on Chen, including Zhu 
Junyi, director of Shanghai’s Labor and Social Security Bureau, and Qin Yu, Chen’s own 
personal assistant.253 In September of 2006, Chen himself was arrested and charged with, 
among other financial misdeeds, siphoning off 3.5 billion yuan from Shanghai’s pension 
fund.254 In 2008, Chen was sentenced to eighteen years in prison and stripped of his offices 
in Shanghai and his membership in the Politburo.255 
Echoing Jiang’s anti-corruption campaign against Chen Xitong and the Beijing 
clique, it is no coincidence that Hu’s campaign against Chen Liangyu and the Shanghai 
clique occurred during the lead up to the leadership transition of the Seventeenth Party 
Congress. Chen himself had been a strong, vocal opponent of Hu’s macroeconomic 
policies and therefore represented a challenge to Hu’s leadership during this important 
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period.256 Additionally, the Shanghai clique, of which Chen was a member and Hu’s 
predecessor Jiang Zemin is the leader, had limited Hu’s ability to solidify power. Before 
leaving office, Jiang had ensured members of the Shanghai clique maintained several 
positions on the Politburo and the PSCs, boxing Hu in politically.257 However, with the 
Seventeenth Party Congress nearing, Chen’s fall was likely a signal that Hu planned to 
stack both the Politburo and the PSC with his own allies, at the first opportunity he had to 
do so.258 
c. Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang 
There are eerily parallels between the cases of Chen Xitong and Chen Liangyu and 
the cases of two “tigers” who fell under Xi—Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang. To be fair, Bo 
fell while Hu was still in power but only mere months before Xi was elected General 
Secretary, making it inconceivable that Xi did not have something to do with Bo’s fall. The 
timing of Bo’s fall actually reinforces the similarities between all four cases. Just like the 
Chen Xitong and Chen Liangyu, both Bo and Zhou fell during crucial leadership 
transitions, Bo while Xi was taking power and Zhou while Xi was solidifying it. 
Additionally, both Bo and Zhou represented threats to Xi’s power, Bo for attempting to 
establish what has been characterized as a fiefdom in Chongqing while almost openly 
campaigning for the positions Xi currently occupies and Zhou for his close relationship 
with Bo and therefore his displeasure with the leadership of the Eighteenth Party 
Congress.259 In addition to these two major similarities, the method of investigating those 
who surround the “tiger” before investing the “tiger” himself, the lengthy prison terms and 
removals from office (which essentially amount to purge), and the efforts to neutralize 
these rival power nodes are common throughout all four cases. Ultimately, Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign has followed a largely established political pattern and an exact 
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methodology when it comes to using anti-corruption campaigns to remove political 
rivals.260 
d. Other Patterns  
While the historical context certainly paints eerie parallels between Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign and those of the past, demonstrating historical continuities does not 
in and of itself prove that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is politically motivated. But 
looking at the vast amounts of data available (given that there have been so many 
“occurrences”) has yielded substantial opportunity to look for statistical patterns in those 
who have been investigated for corruption. A cursory glance immediately demonstrates 
some distinct patterns. Aside from the officials surrounding Zhou Yongkang who have 
been investigated and charged, networks of officials targeted in the corruption campaign 
can be observed in the province of Shanxi, in a network centered around former President 
Hu Jintao’s top aide Ling Jihua; in the province of Yunnan, a network centered on the 
former provincial party secretary Bai Enpei; in Jiangxi, in a network centered on former 
CPPCC vice-chairman Su Rong; and in Guangdong, in a network centered on former 
Guangzhou Party Secretary Wang Qingliang.261 Diving deeper into the data supports these 
cursory glances, as a member of a “big-tiger faction” (the big tigers being Zhou, Ling, and 
Su) is more likely to be targeted in a new anti-corruption probe as opposed to an official 
who is not a part of these networks.262 
Stepping back from a purely network analysis yields substantial patterns based on 
factional affiliation. Here, it is important to define what is meant by factional affiliation. 
When one defines factional affiliation with a group at large—the CCYL faction or the 
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princeling faction for example—there is no significant correlation between membership in 
a certain faction and targeting or shielding in Xi’s anti-corruption probe. 263 However, 
when factional affiliation is defined as individual connections, specifically connections 
related to birthplace, school affiliation, and work affiliations, such affiliations do matter in 
the anti-corruption campaign. According to one study, officials with birthplace and 
educational connections to incumbent PSC members are less likely to be investigated for 
corruption.264 Crucially, such shielding applies only to those with connection to incumbent 
members of the PSC; officials with connections to retired members of the PSC do not 
receive any similar protection. 265  According to another study, not even officials with ties 
to current Politburo members are shielded; only those with birthplace and workplace 
connections to Xi Jinping himself receive any protection from the anti-corruption 
campaign. 266 The difference between the two studies, in the scope of protection and the 
types of connections that provide protection, is likely due to the different samples the 
authors’ analyzed. However, the central point form both analyses remains clear—at a 
minimum, individuals with personal connections to Xi Jinping have been largely protected 
throughout his anti-corruption campaign.  
What this ultimately demonstrates that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is a political 
tool. Despite his reputation as a genuine graft buster, the patterns in Xi’s campaign are 
unmistakable. He has followed the procedures of past, politically-motivated anti-
corruption efforts to the letter. He has also investigated so many officials as part of his anti-
corruption campaign that robust statistical analysis can now be conducted, analysis which 
suggests the campaign has targeted groups of officials surrounding certain high-profile 
individuals and avoided officials with personal connections to Xi. Ultimately, such a 
pattern suggests that Xi, in accordance with the trend outlined in chapter II of this thesis, 
is once personalizing politics in the PRC. Factions do seem to be forming, but not along 
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the lines traditionally prescribed. Instead, the factions made clear as a result of the anti-
corruption campaign revolve around individual connections.  
E. CONCLUSION: ANTI-CORRUPTION OBSCURES GREATER ISSUES 
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is undoubtedly exceptional in its length, its scope, 
and its depth. Indeed, the campaign has lasted longer, has targeted more officials, and has 
targeted officials that were previously protected by informal party norms. What is not 
exceptional is Xi’s use of his anti-corruption campaign as a political tool. Both of Xi’s 
predecessors—Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—utilized anti-corruption campaigns in this 
manner during their terms, and it is clear that Xi is doing the same with his campaign. 
However, combining both these facts suggests that Xi is engaging in an unprecedented 
effort to eliminate political opposition to his efforts to centralize political power in the 
PRC. Crucially these networks are personal, not ideological or factional, suggesting that 
Xi’s targets may simply object to Xi personally, not the centralization of power as a policy. 
Whatever the case, it is clear Xi does have political enemies, nodes of power throughout 
the PRC that could oppose his efforts, but he has skillfully used his anti-corruption 
campaign to silence them.  
Ultimately, political maneuvering is but one of the very distinct reasons to begin an 
anti-corruption campaign in the PRC. As mentioned, such campaigns are often utilized as 
political tools to purge members of the party who would challenge the current leaders. In 
Xi’s case, he seems to be targeting networks of individuals who would stand in the way of 
his effort to remake the Chinese political system. Anti-corruption efforts are also used to 
legitimize the party in the eyes of the people, demonstrating the CCP’s commitment to 
tackling the problem of corruption. Again, in the case of Xi’s campaign, the anti-corruption 
effort is likely a move to shore up public support for the CCP as the party reinforces its 
positions as the legitimate rulers of the PRC. Ironically, anti-corruption efforts in the PRC 
are not actually used to fight corruption, and Xi’s campaign itself, while certainly rooting 
out corrupt individuals, is no exception.  
The reason for this irony has been hinted at throughout this chapter: corruption in 
the PRC is simply too massive and widespread to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, 
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even when the number of those cases reaches more than two million. Serious anti-
corruption campaigns will require substantial changes to the Chinese political-economic 
system. On the economic side, this means ridding the system of opportunities for corruption 
by changing the state’s role in the economy from a commander to a regulator. On the 
political side, this will require an independent legal and law-enforcement system, a 
substantial expansion of the press freedoms, and a radical change in the political culture. 
And if Xi is truly using his anti-corruption campaign to strengthen to CCP’s control of 
society before embarking on these massive reforms, as some have suggested, he us unlikely 
to succeed.267 
In the end, it is doubtful the party will embark on these reforms because they would 
undermine the very system that sustains the party. For better or for worse, corruption may 
serve as an adhesive that binds the many levels of cadre together. Because cadre at different 
levels benefit from the corruption that the CCP allows, all cadre are invested in continuing 
the CCP’s rule. True anti-corruption measures would undermine this fragile balance 
require a crackdown on the highest levels of the CCP leadership, a move no one seems 
willing to make. Therefore, the CCP will continue to take half-hearted measures at 
combatting corruption in a way that both deals with the problem enough to demonstrate to 
the public that it is being dealt with and yields an effective weapon for the current regime 
to wield against political opponents 
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V. XI’S PLAN: THE RIGHT PATH FORWARD? 
A. XI’S PLAN: HOW DID IT HAPPEN? 
At the NPC in March of 2018, it became obvious, even to those who were not 
looking, that Xi Jinping had a plan. At that congress, delegates voted overwhelmingly to 
abolish presidential term limits, removing the legal constraints on Xi’s time in office. 
However, even more significantly was Xi’s decision not to nominate a successor to his 
office of General Secretary of the CCP, breaking with decades of tradition and paving the 
way for Xi to remain in office for a third term. Such actions, upon close inspection, are part 
of a pattern of political reform, one initiated by Xi that is meant to centralize power in 
Chinese society on the CCP and centralize power within the CCP on Xi himself. Therefore, 
the question is how was Xi able to centralize political power in himself with so little 
obvious opposition using reforms in direct conflict with the system of collective leadership 
that was being institutionalized when he took office?  
To answer this question, I first looked for evidence that Xi was indeed centralizing 
power on himself within the PRC. In chapter II, I found that since Xi Jinping’s ascension 
to power during the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, Chinese politics has undoubtedly 
witnessed a definite shift in the political currents. By changing the Chinese political system 
from one of institutional politics, in which to rules and norms determine who holds political 
power, to a system of personal politics, in which proximity to individuals and political 
networks determine the holders of political power, Xi has centralized political power in the 
PRC and the CCP on himself. In other words, the pendulum that has come to define many 
aspects of Chinese politics has begun swinging away from institutional politics and toward 
personal politics, marking a definitive break with institutional politics but not necessarily 
a complete reversion to personal politics.  
The most obvious symptom of that change has been the abolition of term limits on 
the Chinese presidency, which, in conjunction with Xi’s decision not to appoint a successor 
for the position of General Secretary of the CCP, suggests Xi intends to rule well past the 
norm of ten years. In addition to this action, Xi has moved to consolidate his decision-
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making power by surrounding himself with allies in the PSC and the Politburo and by 
taking control of an unprecedented number of leading small groups. His political strength 
is only buttressed by his popularity among the actual Chinese populous, a symptom of a 
deliberate effort to build a unique cult of personality around Xi and to permanently enshrine 
his contributions to CCP thought in the CCP’s party constitution. Even more importantly 
than his relationship to the Chinese people is his relationship to the PLA. As part of his 
reform packages, Xi has brought massive reforms to the PLA itself, streaming lining the 
decision-making within the PLA as a whole and the CMC in particular and therefore, 
whether inadvertently or by design, centralizing military power within his own hands. 
Clearly, Xi’s era represents a change with the past, one in which rules and norms have 
become less important than a leader who can accomplish the difficult changes that need to 
come to the PRC. 
That being said, those who view the Xi era of Chinese politics as a return to the 
Maoist era may be over exaggerating the changes actually taking place within Chinese 
politics. In the first place, the norm of retirement age has, to date, remained robust and 
effective. Turnover at the Nineteenth Party Congress saw the retirement of those CCP 
leaders in the Politburo who had reached age sixty-eight or holder during the previous 
term.268 The crucial test for this norm, however, will come at the Twentieth Party Congress 
in 2020, at which time Xi Jinping himself will be expected to retire in accordance with the 
norm. Still, the heretofore adherence to the norm of retirement age is not the only indication 
that Chinese politics has not returned to the Maoist era. While Xi has certainly developed 
a cult of personality like Mao, the content of the cults themselves are not the same. While 
Mao sought to portray himself as above all others, Xi seeks to present himself as a common 
man, humanizing not deifying himself in the eyes of the people. In summation, Xi Jinping 
has certainly brought about a new era of politics in China, moving the pendulum back 
toward the personal politics of the Mao era and away from the institutional politics pushed 
by Deng Xiaoping.  
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After firmly establishing that Chinese politics is undergoing a definitive shift, I 
analyzed two explanations for this shift. In chapter III, evaluated if Xi was centralizing 
political power as a result of a party consensus to do just that. I found that Xi Jinping began 
his first term of General Secretary of the CCP, President of the PRC, and Chairman of the 
CMC with a clear mandate: bring the necessary economic reforms to the PRC and do so 
quickly. This seems to have grown out of the sense of frustration with Xi’s predecessor, 
Hu Jintao, who was unable to fulfill the promises of economic reform he made in his first 
term, especially after the GFC of 2007 and 2008. To Chinese leaders, the blame for this 
failure rested at the feet of Hu and the political system he oversaw. Hu himself has been 
portrayed as an overly cautious leader, one lacking the political gravitas to enact the tough 
reforms necessary to keep the PRC’s trajectory of upward economic growth. As such, 
Chinese leaders also indicted the system of collective leadership that came to fruition under 
Hu, calling for institutional reforms that would centralize power within the political system, 
an idea that likely originated in the perceived success of the relatively centralized economic 
system of the PRC in weathering the GFC. Eventually, during the Eighteenth Party 
Congress in 2012, these institutional and attitudinal changes were manifested in both the 
shrinking of the size of the PSC and the statements, some by Hu himself, about the 
necessity of an effective, centralized leadership. As a result, Xi received carte blanche to 
begin that very process of centralizing political power. Ironically, the GFC itself and the 
Chinese response to it seems to have inhibited Hu’s ability to enact reform more than either 
Hu’s weak leadership or the system of collective leadership itself, raising the important 
question of if the response of Chinese leaders was actually the correct one.  
In chapter IV, I analyzed a second explanation—Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. I 
evaluated if Xi was truly leveraging his anti-corruption campaign as a political tool in order 
to push his political agenda. I found that, to deal with opposition to his political program, 
Xi began a politically-motivated anti-corruption campaign, targeting members of networks 
that opposed his centralization policies. Indeed, members in networks surrounding CCP 
tigers—high-ranking members of the CCP—are more likely to be investigated than those 
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who are not members. 269 That being said, the political use of anti-corruption efforts is not 
unique to Xi; both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao used them to purge their major political 
rivals while consolidating political power. 270 While Xi has undoubtedly followed the 
tradition of his predecessors, Xi’s own anti-corruption campaign can be distinguished by 
its sheer length, scope, and depth. To date, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has lasted longer 
and brought in more people than any campaign that has come before. Xi also seems 
unrestricted by an unwritten rule concerning targets of anti-corruption campaigns, as he 
has shown no qualms in taking down former PSC committee members, their families, and 
their associates. Accordingly, he has disciplined four times as many tigers during the term 
of the Eighteenth Party Congress than the number of tigers disciplined during the last four 
party congresses combined. 271 
It seems counter-intuitive that Xi would have to initiate an anti-corruption 
campaign in order to push policies that have been blessed by the CCP as a whole, but the 
two are easily reconcilable in the context of a party with many different power bases. While 
the party is often portrayed as a monolithic block, competing networks of individuals often 
emerge as a result of educational and professional experiences. While it is unclear that 
those networks not in Xi’s orbit opposed his centralization of power on ideological 
grounds, it is easy to see how they would see such a centralization as a political threat to 
their own power base. Therefore, while party members seemed to have accepted the 
necessity of centralizing power in a single strong figure, they likely did not agree on who 
that figure should be. Nevertheless, Xi pushed ahead with political and economic reform 
almost immediately, but this centralization of power in Xi’s hands undoubtedly drew the 
ire of those who were not within Xi’s political networks. Those alternative networks seem 
to have been the main targets of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.  
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In the end, Xi’s mandate to centralize power in the Chinese political system was 
likely the most important factor in his rise to power in the Chinese political system as he 
could not have embarked on such massive reform without the blessing of the party nor 
could he have done so in the context of a party deeply opposed to such reform without 
serious backlash. The anti-corruption campaign, within a political context, seems to have 
been an additional method by which Xi has consolidated power, a supplement to the 
process but not enough on its own. However, these two factors combined have paved the 
way for dramatic changes in Chinese politics. As mentioned before, it is doubtful that Xi 
will completely resurrect the politics of the Mao era, and even more doubtful that he wants 
to. Xi, having seen his father purged and having come of age during the Cultural 
Revolution, likely possesses no desire to see himself become the next Mao, invested with 
complete political power. Instead, his goal seems much broader—the strengthening not of 
himself but of the PRC as a whole. 
B. CATCH 22: THE CHINESE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DILEMMA 
After more than forty years of political and economic reform, the PRC and the CCP 
are at a crossroads. For the first time since the reform period began, economic reform may 
be challenging the CCP’s hold on political power. Economically, the CCP must begin 
difficult economic reforms that would dramatically change the political-economic system 
within the country in order to follow the economic path of other advanced economies and 
continue to grow the country. However, politically, that path will, at the very least, 
undermine the economic levers that the CCP views as central to protecting the economy 
and could, at the other extreme, undermine the CCP’s hold on power in the PRC. Against 
this backdrop of growing domestic uncertainty, the PRC’s rise as a major source of global 
and economic power has garnered the attention of the world’s major powerholders, most 
notably the United States, many of which increasingly see the PRC as a growing threat to 
the world order. This situation is not lost on CCP, who are acutely aware of the difficult 
choices ahead, nor has it escaped the attention of the CCP’s most important leader, Xi 
Jinping. In fact, Xi’s actions, when viewed through the context of this uncertain political-
economic period, appear to be guided by this dilemma. 
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Xi’s political program seeks to centralize political power in the PRC in the CCP 
and centralize political power within the CCP in himself. He has broken with several rules 
and norms developed over the past forty years of the reform period to do so and seems to 
have been largely successful in initiating this political change. In order to do so, Xi drew 
upon the ubiquitous feeling of dissatisfaction with the pace of reform throughout the party 
in order to unite the CCP behind his political program of power centralization. He utilized 
a massive anti-corruption campaign to pressure or eliminate important members of the 
party and their underlings who, through their separate power bases, could challenge this 
political program. Ultimately, Xi’s answer to the Chinese political-economic dilemma has 
been a shift in the political system from institutional politics to personal politics. But why 
has he decided to make this decision? And will it ultimately work? 
The remainder of this chapter will seek to answer those pressing questions, 
questions which will be significant to individuals in the governments, the militaries, the 
multi-national organizations, and the countries well outside the CCP and the PRC. First, I 
will attempt to evaluate why Xi embarked on this particular political program, endeavoring 
to make sense of Xi’s and the CCP’s actions in the context of the political-economic 
dilemma facing the PRC today. Then, I will attempt to answer the question of if this effort 
will work, drawing upon political and economic analysis to make a candid assessment 
about the possibilities of Chinese success. In conclusion, I will reflect on what the CCP’s 
and the PRC’s success in this endeavor will mean for the country and for the rest of the 
world and, alternatively, what their failure will mean for the Chinese people and the people 
of the world.  
C. XI’S PLAN: WHY DID IT HAPPEN? 
There is a persistent narrative in Western media to portray Xi Jinping’s power 
centralization as a play for power, with political power being both the means and the ends 
of Xi’s political changes. However, such a narrative ignores the process by which Xi 
centralized political power in the first place. He could not have done so without the 
acquiescence of many within the CCP, and CCP leaders would not have acquiesced unless 
they viewed a pressing need for power centralization. In accordance with this analysis, 
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there is no doubt that they saw power centralization as a means to achieve pressing 
economic reform. Therefore, Xi’s mandate to centralize political power in China seems to 
have only come along with the mandate to continue to push economic reform. That being 
said, to view Xi’s political program as a means to achieving a more balanced economy 
misses the intricate connections between economics, politics, and society within the PRC. 
Xi’s political reforms surely grew out of a pressing need for economic reforms, but those 
economic reforms are pressing because the CCP views them as a key for their continued 
rule of the PRC. 
What makes Xi’s mandate to pursue economic reform important is the fact that the 
PRC has reached a crucial phase of its economic development, one that could decide the 
economic trajectory of the country for years to come. The PRC can continue its economic 
growth by shifting its growth model—from government spending and investment to 
consumption in the case of the PRC—and moving up the production value chain by 
manufacturing high-technology, high-quality finished goods. Alternatively, the PRC could 
fail to do this and become stuck in what many have termed the middle-income trap, a 
dynamic in which middle-income countries lose their comparative advantages in high-
labor, low-technology industries but fail to develop innovative, high-technology industries 
to continue to compete in the global marketplace. The CCP leadership’s fear that the PRC 
will get stuck in the middle-income trap is likely what drove the powerful reaction to Hu 
Jintao’s failed economic policies and the accompanying support for Xi’s power 
centralization, a policy which reversed decades of political institutionalization. 
The link between the political changes brought about by Xi with the support of 
other CCP leaders and the economic dilemma facing the PRC is only clear when the unique 
political-economic system in the PRC is taken into account. The CCP viewed political 
changes as necessary to push through economic changes because, for all its movement 
toward a market system since 1976, the CCP, through the Chinese government, still 
maintains a large hand in the Chinese economic system. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
still seem to dominate the commanding heights of the economy, from power generation 
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and energy to defense and telecommunications.272 Capital flows, both into and out of the 
PRC, are highly regulated, and the government-run banks maintain a plurality of the total 
banking-assets within the country.273 Moreover, Chinese leaders continue to rely on 
massive investments from the state in order to shore up economic growth in times of 
trouble, most prominently with the GFC and more recently with the trade war between the 
United States and the PRC.274 
But perhaps the single most important element of state involvement in the economy 
is not any legitimate mechanism at all, but rather the massive amount of corruption that 
lubricates the Chinese political-economic system. The strange amalgamation of state-
control and market forces in the PRC leads to ample opportunity for corruption, which 
seems to be why, as mentioned previously, corruption became endemic to the Chinese 
political-economic system after economic reforms began in the late 1970s. Such corruption 
has only accelerated since then, with the median bribe amount doubling between 2000 and 
2009, even when accounting for inflation.275 In past years, corruption arguably 
complimented reform, inducing many officials to continue to pursue economic reform and 
disappearing once that reform has had been completed.276 But more recently, corruption 
seems to have become more predatory, an obstacle rather than a compliment to reform and 
growth. Indeed, while the continued existence of corruption, SOEs, government banking, 
and all other manner of government control in the economy may not have impeded growth 
and reform in the past, today, with the PRC’s slowing economic growth and increasing 
stakes surrounding successful economic reform, the impact of these factors is no longer 
marginal. 
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The problem for Xi is that the corruption and state involvement in the economy has 
created a system of vested interests, individuals who are invested in the continuation of the 
current political-economic system. This includes the CCP cadre who stand to make 
millions if not billions of yuan from lucrative but corrupt dealings. This also includes the 
bureaucrats who manage the SOE and government-run banks; if the government moved to 
privatize many of these parts of the Chinese economy, such individuals would quickly find 
themselves out of the job. This is the problem that Hu Jintao was unable to solve, and it is 
now the problem Xi Jinping has been tasked with solving. To Xi and the political elite of 
the PRC, Hu Jintao was unable to push effective economic reform because of his weak 
leadership and the system of collective leadership. The two factors, in the eyes of the 
political elite, allowed vested interests to continue to rebuff reform attempts, leading to 
reform stagnation in Hu’s second term. Xi and the CCP have sought to fix that problem by 
molding Xi into a strong leader and reversing the institutionalization of collective 
leadership so that he will be able to personally control the reform agenda. Doing so would 
reduce the voice of these vested interests in decision-making and allow the CCP and the 
PRC to more easily push through the reforms that would allow them to escape the middle-
income trap. Whether or not such a strategy will work is an open question, but there are 
many reasons to be doubtful about its success.  
D. XI’S PLAN: WILL IT WORK? 
Xi’s plan to revive economic reform within the PRC is undoubtedly well-
intentioned, a bid to continue the impressive trajectory of the Chinese economy and grow 
the PRC into a powerful state. Yet, while the intentions may be good, the execution to date 
has been poor. Xi has been successful in centralizing power within the Chinese political 
system, but he has been unsuccessful in actually carrying out the crucial economic reforms 
that would prevent the PRC from falling into the middle-income trap. Why has his strategy 
not been successful? Put simply, it is because the CCP does not want to carry through with 
these economic reforms for fear of losing its control over the country. Whenever CCP rule 
is threatened by domestic or outside forces, the necessity of maintaining political control 
seems to trump the imperative of economic reform. Therefore, the prospects of for the 
success of Xi’s and the CCP’s grand plan seem bleak.  
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The first problem with the political-economic reform plan is that the CCP 
misdiagnosed the problem in the first place. The ability of vested interests to influence Hu 
Jintao and his leadership team was not the problem that stalled reform during his second 
term. The problem that stalled reform was Hu’s own reluctance to implement reform for 
fear of what it would it do to the CCP’s power throughout the country. In the face of the 
GFC, Hu prioritized stability over reform, bringing back some of the worst practices of 
state economic control in order to stabilize the Chinese economy. Faced with an already 
volatile social situation and fearing that it could become worse as a result of economic 
turmoil, Hu and the CCP leadership initiated massive stimulus and sent signals to banks to 
initiate a no-holds-barred lending spree, setting back the goal of transitioning from an 
investment-driven economy to a consumption driven-economy.277 Ironically, Hu was 
vindicated for this, and the party doubled down in this strategy, believing if centralization 
could save them from economic disaster during the GFC, it could save them from the 
political disaster of reform failure. 
A similar if less dire dynamic has emerged under Xi despite the centralization of 
power in his hands. In the face of a threatening trade war, Xi and his leadership have relied 
on the state sector of the Chinese economy more and more to continue the country’s 
economic growth.278 While such a strategy will in the short and medium terms likely allow 
the PRC to outlast the United States in this economic confrontation, in the long term, such 
a strategy only continues the CCP’s and PRC’s reliance on state sectors that will inevitably 
prevent them from successfully transitioning to a high-income economy. So long as this 
dynamic lasts, it is best to be cautious about the possibilities of further economic reform in 
the PRC and therefore about the possibilities of the PRC successfully escaping the middle-
income trap. At the end of the day, the CCP has demonstrated it is unwilling to accept 
economic pain and risk losing political power in the short term to the detriment of both its 
economic and political power in the long term. 
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This bias toward the short term seems to be the natural reaction of a party wary 
about the extent of its control over the country. A party more secure in its position may be 
more willing to accept short-term losses for long-term gain. However, the CCP has 
indicated it is concerned about two avenues through which their control over the PRC could 
deteriorate—bottom-up regime change and regime fracturing. Only one seems like a 
remote possibility. With respect to the former, bottom-up regime change can come about 
as a result of economic dissatisfaction, making the continuation of high economic growth 
an imperative to remain in control. However, the possibility that the Chinese people will 
actually succeed in overthrowing the CCP is small, namely because the repressive abilities 
of the Chinese state and the CCP remain strong. The PLA, while becoming increasing 
professional, remains part of the party and not the state and Xi’s military reforms will only 
serve to reinforce that dynamic. Nor do the Chinese internal security forces show any signs 
of weakening; indeed, to the contrary, their budget appears larger than that of the PLA 
itself, suggesting a large and robust capacity to suppress dissent among the general 
population.279 
Disregarding the possibility of bottom-up regime change, one is left with the 
possibility of regime fracturing, in which members of the CCP begin to turn against the 
party and pursue alternative systems of governance in the PRC, and this seems like the 
more dangerous threat to CCP power. This would not be a problem for a robust, 
ideologically united party, similar to the CCP that existed between the 1930s and the 1950s, 
but that is not the CCP of today. The ideology that united the CCP of the past is all but 
dead as the CCP is not an ideological coherent block but simply a vehicle for political 
power, welcoming private businessmen (i.e., capitalist) into their ranks. The boredom of 
CCP members is palpable in meetings extolling the party line, and books and pamphlets 
explaining the ideology of the CCP are dead on arrival.280 The CCP’s increasing repression 
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of students, activists, and minorities and its constant demands for pledges of loyalty are not 
commensurate with the attitudes of a party secure in its own, ideological power.281 
Without the ideological glue, it seems to the CCP has turned to another, less 
becoming adhesive to maintain the loyalty of party members—corruption. Indeed, in recent 
years, it seems corruption has become the glue holding the CCP together. With socialist 
ideology revered purely in pro forma exercises, there does not seem to be much else to 
keep political elite within the CCP from defecting in times of trouble for the regime. This, 
however, is the ultimate paradox for the CCP. Pushing through economic reforms would 
require a period of economic pain during which the country would transition from a 
middle-income country to high-income country, but such a move would minimize the 
opportunity for corruption. Not only would there be fewer spoils of economic growth to go 
around, the avenues of corruption themselves would be closed in the process of reform. 
And if the Chinese leadership were serious about creating a stronger economy and political 
system, they would have to take on and end corruption itself. 
This is ostensibly what Xi has been attempting to do with his anti-corruption 
campaign. However, as mentioned before, true anti-corruption efforts would require a 
radical change in the political and legal systems in the country, changes the CCP seems 
unwilling to make. Xi and the CCP therefore content themselves with treating the 
symptoms not the causes of corruption because they know that treating the latter would 
undermine the CCP’s rule. Not only would building up political and legal institutions take 
power away from the CCP but ending corruption in the Chinese political-economic system 
would fracture the CCP entirely, leading to internecine conflict that would tear the CCP 
apart and end their monopoly on political power in the PRC. That is why Xi Jinping is 
unwilling to do what it takes to actually end corruption in the PRC. That is why Xi, like 
Hu, will continue to fall back on ill-advised economic policies in times of economic and 
political crisis. And that is why the PRC may ultimately be doomed to fall victim to the 
middle-income trap. 
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E. CONCLUSION: ONE STEP BACK, NO STEPS FORWARD  
The failure of the PRC to transition from a middle-income to a high-income 
economy would certainly have dramatic consequences for the PRC itself. A slowing 
economic and a growing demand for the government to provide social services to an aging 
population seems like a recipe for social unrest. With fewer resources to draw upon, the 
PLA and the internal security forces within the CCP would atrophy, adding the crucial 
ingredient for regime change. However, the CCP has demonstrated an uncanny ability to 
adjust to changing times, suggesting that they could find a way to hold on to political power 
within the country. If that were the case, the CCP could last for a while yet, a slowly 
deteriorating ruling party held together by cronyism and an intense desire to simply 
survive.  
On world stage, the failure of the PRC to transition would send ripple effects across 
the globe. A world without explosive Chinese growth and investment may well see slowing 
growth of its own. Even more worrisome is the possibility that, in the face of dim economic 
prospects, the Chinese debt bubble would burst, sending shockwaves across the global 
economy. A weakened PRC would slowly recede back to its own shores, ending the 
perception, especially prevalent throughout the West, that the PRC seeks to dominate East 
Asia. But a weakened PRC would also be a less useful political and economic partner, with 
limited political clout and a slowing domestic economy. Contrary to the belief of some, the 
economic collapse of the PRC may not be the boom for others that some may perceive it 
to be.  
That being said, such predictions are long off in the future. The next three years, 
until the convening of the Twentieth Party Congress in 2022, are likely to be much of the 
same. Xi Jinping will continue to grasp more and more power in his own hands and 
continue to place the CCP at the center of Chinese life by persuasion or by force. His anti-
corruption campaign is likely to continue so long as it simultaneously picks off his political 
foes and strengthens the legitimacy of the party. However, once the anti-corruption effort 
is perceived to be damaging rather than strengthening the CCP’s image (an outcome that 
may not be that far off), Xi will likely stop the campaign. All in all, collective leadership 
and institutional politics will continue to wither away in the face of personal politics, while 
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the political climate in the PRC becomes more and more repressive and the economic 
climate less and less optimistic. 
What began as a reaction to the failure of one leader to execute reform may result 
in the failure of another, only this time it will be a failure of the CCP’s own creation. While 
Xi Jinping is undoubtedly a skilled politician and an informed economic technocrat, he 
alone is unlikely divine the solution to the CCP’s current catch-22. While he is not without 
his fellow members of the PSC and Politburo to help him along the way, his seizure of 
power has certainly cast a pall over the political climate in the CCP, with fewer members 
seeming willing to speak out and even fewer willing to execute reform without orders from 
above. Ironically, this seems to have been the problem that institutional politics was meant 
to solve. By attempting to institutionalize many aspects of Chinese political space, Deng 
Xiaoping sought to make CCP members less concerned about competition for political 
power and focus their energies on effective governance. Xi and the modern CCP have 
turned their backs on that system, opting instead for a centralization of political power in 
order to better economic performance. The hope is that doing so will allow the PRC and 
CCP to go one step back and two steps forward. However, the more likely outcome is that 
CCP is left with a leader who holds unchallenged political power in the country but without 
the economic reforms and progress it so desires. In other word, the CCP may have created 
a situation in which it will go one step back and no steps forward. 
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